

The Indian reactionaries are at once naked aggressors and servile lackeys of U.S. imperialism. No one who is genuinely opposed to U.S. imperialism can fail to give resolute support to the people of Pakistan in their resistance to Indian aggression. You do not support this struggle against aggression yourselves, and you forbid others to do so. This stand of yours shows that you regard U.S. imperialism not as the principal enemy but as the principal friend.

In your letter, you feign concern for the Vietnamese people's struggle against U.S. aggression and allege that the conflict between India and Pakistan hampers this struggle. This is strange logic. Marxist-Leninists always hold that the peoples' struggles against aggression support each other. Like all other struggles against U.S. imperialism and its lackeys, the struggle of the Pakistani people against the aggression launched by the Indian reactionaries at the instigation of U.S. imperialism helps the struggle of the Vietnamese people against U.S. aggression. How can it be said to hamper the anti-U.S. struggle of the Vietnamese people? According to your logic,

are not all other peoples opposing U.S. imperialism and its lackeys guilty of hampering the Vietnamese people in their struggle against U.S. aggression? Is it not clear that this assertion of yours only helps the imperialists and all reactionaries to bind the hands of the peoples in their struggle against aggression, and is therefore harmful to the anti-U.S. struggle of the Vietnamese people?

In your letter, moreover, you make the unwarranted charge that the Chinese Government's note to India of September 16 has "further complicated" the situation in this area. In that note the Chinese Government demanded that India should demolish the 56 military works she built for aggression within Chinese territory on the China-Sikkim border and that she should withdraw her intruding troops. This is the inviolable right of the Chinese Government and people in safeguarding their state sovereignty and territorial integrity. Without once condemning India for her repeated intrusions into China, you come forward to charge us with "complicating the situation" when, tried beyond endurance, we justly demanded the withdrawal of the Indian aggressors from Chinese territory. What kind of logic is this? Should we take

the Indian aggression lying down and make a present of our territory to the Indian reactionaries? You try to intimidate us by referring to the United States. Do you really think that the Chinese people are like you and will tremble at the mere mention of U.S. imperialism?

As a matter of fact, after the Chinese Government took firm measures, the Indian reactionaries, as panicky as a pack of thieves, had to withdraw their troops who had intruded into Chinese territory across the China-Sikkim boundary, within the time-limit set by the Chinese Government, and thus they once again revealed themselves to the world as aggressors. Was this not a very good thing? Why should you be so terribly uneasy about the predicament of the Indian reactionaries?

To sum up, you put up the signboards of "peace", "unity" and "struggle against imperialism" both on the question of the conflict between India and Pakistan and on the question of the Sino-Indian boundary, but in fact you encourage aggression and war of aggression, sabotage Asian-African unity and the unity of the socialist countries, oppose socialist China and serve U.S. imperialism and its lackeys. You have completely exposed yourselves; you are continuing the line of Khrushchov.

revisionism and, indeed, are carrying this line even further.

In your letter, you ask the Communist Party of China to adopt "a united stand" with you. Does not this amount to asking us to join you in an alliance with India against China? Does not this amount to asking us to join you in an alliance with the Indian reactionaries for aggression against Pakistan and for the sacrifice of the right of the Kashmiri people to self-determination? Does not this amount to asking us to join you in betraying the revolutionary interests of the people of the world and subordinating their anti-imperialist struggles to the line of Soviet-U.S. collaboration? Does not this amount to asking us to join you in implementing the line of "peaceful coexistence, peaceful transition and peaceful competition" laid down by your 20th and 22nd Congresses? If we did that, would we not become revisionists like yourselves? Dear Comrades, that will never happen.

With fraternal greetings,

The Central Committee of
the Communist Party
of China

ЦЕНТРАЛЬНОМУ КОМИТЕТУ
КОММУНИСТИЧЕСКОЙ ПАРТИИ КИТАЯ

Дорогие товарищи!

Центральный Комитет Коммунистической партии Советского Союза решил обратиться к вам в связи с напряженной обстановкой, сложившейся в результате вооруженного конфликта между Индией и Пакистаном. По имеющейся у нас информации, масштабы вооруженного столкновения между Индией и Пакистаном все более расширяются. Обе стороны вводят в действие значительные контингенты войск и военной техники, в том числе танки, авиацию, военно-морские силы. Вооруженный конфликт между Пакистаном и Индией грозит перерасти в большую войну.

Это столкновение противоречит национальным интересам народов самих этих стран. Оно подрывает их экономику, ведет к снижению жизненного уровня трудящихся, усиливает зависимость этих государств от империалистов. В обеих странах растет волна шовинистических и милитаристских настроений, внимание рабочего класса и широких народных масс Индии и Пакистана отвлекается от борьбы за решение насущных социальных проблем. В обстановке чрезвычайного военного положения реакция в этих странах получает более широкие возможности для наступления

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на демократические права народа, расширения репрессий против революционных сил.

Возникновение и расширение нового военного конфликта в Азии накаляет и без того напряженную международную обстановку и создает серьезную угрозу всеобщему миру. Если рассматривать этот конфликт в широком плане, с точки зрения задач борьбы против основного врага -- американского империализма, -- то в обстановке продолжающегося нарастания агрессии США во Вьетнаме вооруженное столкновение между Индией и Пакистаном объективно помогает американскому правительству отвлечь внимание народов от борьбы против агрессии США, ослабляет выступления прогрессивных и миролюбивых сил в защиту вьетнамского народа, против империалистической политики агрессии и войны. Это дает возможность американскому империализму усиливать военно-политический нажим на ДРВ и другие миролюбивые страны, еще дальше продвигаться на пути своей разбойничьей "эскалации".

Вооруженный конфликт между двумя крупными государствами Азии -- Индией и Пакистаном -- причиняет огромный политический ущерб делу объединения стран Азии и Африки для борьбы против империализма, колониализма и неоколониализма, наносит удар по движению за укрепление афро-азиатской солидарности.

Таким образом, вооруженный конфликт между Индией и Пакистаном во всех отношениях вреден для стран социа-

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листического лагеря, международного коммунистического движения, национально-освободительного движения, для борьбы против империалистической политики агрессии и войны.

В этой связи мы хотели бы сказать вам со всей откровенностью, что у нас вызвала недоумение позиция правительства КНР, которое полностью и безоговорочно поддержало одну из сторон. Разве не ясно, что такая позиция, независимо от того, чем она продиктована, объективно служит разжиганию конфликта, вызывает огорчение у всех сторонников мира и борцов за национальное освобождение.

Независимо от причин возникновения вооруженного столкновения между Индией и Пакистаном, совершенно ясно одно: от дальнейшего расширения этого конфликта выиграют только силы империализма и реакции, только те, кто снова хотел бы набросить колониальное иго на народы стран Азии и Африки. У нас создается впечатление, что обострение отношений между Индией и Пакистаном, а также военное столкновение между ними являются результатом провокации империалистических сил, действующих методом "разделяй и властвуй". Эта далеко идущая провокация направлена на подрыв международного антиимпериалистического фронта.

Вот почему народы социалистических стран, все революционное и освободительное движение заинтересованы в быстрой ликвидации конфликта между Индией и

Пакистаном.

Мы отдаем себе отчет в сложности тех разногласий, которые существуют между Индией и Пакистаном по территориальному вопросу. Однако мы исходим из ленинских указаний о необходимости особой осторожности в подходе к территориальным проблемам. Такие проблемы могут и должны регулироваться только на основе взаимной договоренности и, конечно, мирными средствами. Долг социалистических государств состоит в том, чтобы способствовать такому решению вопросов, ибо в противном случае империалистам удастся ввергнуть независимые государства в нескончаемые междоусобные войны, перессорить народы Азии и Африки и тем самым создать благоприятные условия для осуществления политики неокOLONиализма.

Правительство КНР не раз заявляло о своей приверженности принципам Бандунгской конференции, которая призвала к урегулированию "всех международных споров мирными средствами, такими, как переговоры, арбитраж или примирение, юридическое урегулирование, так же, как и другими мирными средствами по выбору сторон в соответствии с Уставом ООН".

В заявлении Китайского правительства указывалось: "Оставленные историей споры между азиатско-африканскими странами вполне можно разрешить справедливо и разумно на основе пяти принципов мирного сосуществования и десяти принципов Бандунгской конференции, в духе равноправия и дружественных консультаций... Мы уверены в

том, что споры между азиатско-африканскими странами: рано или поздно будут урегулированы разумно, путем мирных консультаций".

Мы считаем, что именно этими принципами и необходимо руководствоваться в подходе к конфликту между Индией и Пакистаном. В сложившейся обстановке нет положительного смысла в том, чтобы выдвигать на первый план вопрос о причинах возникновения конфликта, искать, кто прав, а кто виноват, это можно будет выяснить, когда пламя войны будет погашено. По нашему глубокому убеждению, в настоящий момент долг и задача всех социалистических и миролюбивых государств заключается в том, чтобы всемерно содействовать прекращению конфликта, использовать свой авторитет и влияние с целью убедить обе враждующие стороны встать на путь мирного урегулирования.

ЦК КПСС обратил внимание на сообщения печати о том, что 17 сентября с.г. Министерство иностранных дел КНР вручило посольству Индии в Пекине ноту, в которой выдвигается требование, чтобы индийская сторона в трехдневный срок демонтировала свои военные сооружения в районе китайско-индийской границы. Мы не информированы о ваших намерениях в этой связи и поэтому предпочли бы не делать в данный момент каких-либо оценок этого вашего шага. Но один вопрос возникает уже сейчас -- не даст ли это повод для империалистических держав, в частности для

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США, к тому, чтобы встать на путь вмешательства, пойти на серьезные военные провокации, что еще более осложнило бы и без того напряженное положение в этом районе.

ЦК КПСС считает, что долг социалистических стран сделать все от них зависящее для срыва империалистических замыслов разжигания кровавых конфликтов между независимыми странами Юго-Восточной Азии и других районов мира. Наша единая позиция по этим вопросам явилась бы самым отрезвляющим средством на пути планов поджигателей войны, эффективной поддержкой для национально-освободительного движения народов.

Мы выражаем надежду, что китайские товарищи правильно оценят усилия КПСС, пойдут путем нашей общей борьбы против империализма и колониализма, борьбы за мир и международную безопасность.

С коммунистическим приветом!

ЦЕНТРАЛЬНЫЙ КОМИТЕТ
КОММУНИСТИЧЕСКОЙ ПАРТИИ СОВЕТСКОГО СОЮЗА

18 сентября 1965 года.

November 5, 1965

The Central Committee of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union

Comrades;

The letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union dated October 21, 1965 reached us on October 23.

The Chinese Communist Party, the Chinese Government and the Chinese people have always regarded the Vietnamese people's struggle against U.S. aggression and for national salvation as their own, and we have been giving the Vietnamese people strong support and assistance. With the expansion by the U.S. imperialists of their aggression against Viet Nam, we steadily stepped up our assistance to the Vietnamese people. We considered this our bounden internationalist duty. However, the Khrushchov revisionist clique adopted a policy of "disengagement" at that time and went to the length of accusing China of provoking the Bac Bo Gulf incident.

You know very well that U.S. aggression against Viet Nam is a grave threat to China too. U.S. planes and warships are constantly intruding into China's territorial air space and waters and committing military provocation. Not only

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must we give full support and assistance to the Vietnamese people in their fight against U.S. aggression and for national salvation, but we must also make intensified preparations for resistance to U.S. aggression. Ours is a gigantic and very heavy task. Yet we have provided all possible facilities and expeditiously transported the material in transit furnished by the socialist countries to Viet Nam.

When Comrade Kosygin passed through Peking in February this year, we advised you to assist Viet Nam sincerely and to provide her with practical and effective weapons, and we agreed to help you transport them. For the last eight months, we have faithfully kept our promise, regardless of whether or not the arms you provided to Viet Nam were practical or effective. Strictly abiding by the agreements we reached separately with the Vietnamese comrades and with yourselves, we have punctually and safely transported all the arms sent by you to Viet Nam, including the obsolete military equipment no longer used by your troops and the damaged arms from your inventories. We have transported these arms gratis. The Vietnamese comrades know all the circumstances, and on more than one occasion your representatives have made positive comments in this regard.

Notwithstanding the fact that we have fulfilled our obligations, you are spreading all sorts of rumours in the Soviet Union and abroad, slanderously alleging that we

have obstructed the transit of your supplies to Viet Nam.

In our letter of reply dated July 14 this year, we thoroughly refuted the shameless lies you had concocted. In that reply we demonstrated that you are unscrupulously utilizing the question of the transit of supplies to Viet Nam to spread slanders against China, that on the pretext of aiding Viet Nam you are trying to bring China and Viet Nam under your control, and that the essence of your aid to Viet Nam is the execution of a policy of appeasing the United States on the question of Viet Nam in the attempt to strike political deals with the United States, to betray the interests of the Vietnamese people's cause of liberation and to tie us to the chariot of Soviet-U.S. collaboration for world domination.

Your threadbare falsehood that China is obstructing the transit of Soviet supplies to Viet Nam has already been exposed. Yet you have in no way resigned yourselves to failure. In your present letter, you have concocted a new lie in addition to repeating the old clichés. You allege that when the Soviet Union applied to China to arrange the transit of military matériel to Viet Nam on August 26, the Chinese authorities "delayed the signing" of an agreement on the one hand and, on the other, "refused to accept for transit" ten mobile weapon-repair shops and forty

anti-aircraft guns on the pretext of the absence of such an agreement.

What are the facts?

On the question of the transport of supplies in transit furnished by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries to Viet Nam, we have invariably acted as follows: every time a country giving aid has approached us with such a request, we have first asked the opinion of the country receiving aid, i.e., Viet Nam, and then, after co-ordinating transport plans between China and Viet Nam, we have arrived at a corresponding agreement with the country giving aid. This practice of ours is an absolutely necessary, entirely normal and irreproachable one, both from the viewpoint of respect for the sovereignty of the country receiving aid and from the viewpoint of the efficient organization of the transport of supplies to Viet Nam. And this is exactly what we did with your application of August 26 for the acceptance for transport of additional supplies in transit of military and technical matériel for Viet Nam for 1965-67. Having received notice of your request, we duly informed the Foreign Ministry of Viet Nam through Chu Chi-wen, Chinese Ambassador to Viet Nam, on September 2; in order to confirm the matter and consult Viet Nam on the question of transport. On September 17 we asked the Viet Nam side

to expedite its answer. On September 27 the Foreign Ministry of Viet Nam gave its confirmation, but made no reply about transport. So on October 7 we again asked for an early reply from the Viet Nam side, and Dang Thanh Van, Commercial Counsellor of the Embassy of Viet Nam in China, indicated that a reply would be forthcoming in the near future. But so far we have not received one. It is of course understandable that the Viet Nam side cannot give a quick answer to a question that involves the organization of transport over a period of more than two years.

Since the Vietnamese comrades have not given us a reply, it is only natural that we cannot give you one either. On September 18 and 30 and October 7, 12 and 18, Chang Chun-ho, Deputy Department Director of China's Commission for Economic Relations with Foreign Countries, explained all this to H. I. Kalinin, the representative of the Soviet Union's Commission for Economic Relations with Foreign Countries, A. A. Shaitan, its acting representative, and Major-General S. D. Romanov, Military Attaché of the Soviet Embassy in China. He told them that we had consulted the Vietnamese comrades on this question but that they had not yet replied, and that we would begin to discuss the signing of an agreement with you as soon as the Vietnamese comrades gave us an answer. But disregarding the facts, you have arbitrarily

charged us with "delaying the signing" of an agreement. Is not this an unfounded accusation and a deliberate calumny?

As for the question of transporting the ten mobile weapon-repair shops and the forty anti-aircraft guns, it was raised by Shaitan to Chang Chun-ho on October 7. On October 12, after receiving the Viet Nam side's consent, Chang Chun-ho saw Major-General Romanov and formally proposed that the transport of the above matériel be arranged by a separate exchange of letters with the Soviet side, so that it could be delivered to Viet Nam as early as possible without waiting for the signing of an agreement on the transport of the additional supplies for 1965-67 to Viet Nam. Twice, first on October 18 and then on October 21, we urged you to hurry with a separate agreement, but you made no reply. On October 23 Chang Chun-ho once again asked for an answer and asked your representatives what was behind this delay in replying. Major-General Romanov said, "Comrade Shaitan and I have already reported on this to Moscow. I, too, don't know why Moscow has not replied up to now." Shaitan said, "I agree with you that an exchange of letters should be made separately with regard to the forty anti-aircraft

guns and the ten mobile weapon-repair shops. To be frank, we, as practical workers, have all along tried and are still trying to solve these problems more quickly, and I, too, don't understand why Moscow has not yet replied."

The facts show in all clearness that the responsibility for the failure to carry out the transit shipment of this matériel in time rests wholly on you. Now you turn on us and accuse China of refusing to arrange the transit on the pretext of the absence of an agreement. Obviously, you are intentionally turning things upside down.

When we said that the agreement concerning the military supplies to Viet Nam listed by you on August 26 could only be signed after we had received a reply from the Vietnamese comrades, you doggedly refused to wait for the reply and insisted on its immediate signing. When we said that a separate exchange of letters could immediately be effected to cover the transport of the ten mobile weapon-repair shops and the forty anti-aircraft guns urgently needed by Viet Nam, you refused and delayed the matter again and again. It is crystal clear that your aim is to create a pretext

for vilifying China.

It must be pointed out further that you have often violated your transport agreements with us. You have frequently failed to submit your plans in time or to despatch your trains according to plan, and you have even sent trains unexpectedly to our frontier railway station in the absence of a plan or of prior notice. To cite examples. According to the stipulations of the transport agreements, you should submit an outline transport plan to us thirty days, and a finalized plan ten days, before the Soviet train reaches the Sino-Soviet border. But sometimes you have submitted your plan only three to five days before the train's arrival. The supplies scheduled to reach our frontier railway station on August 26 arrived as late as September 9. On August 28, you suddenly brought in thirteen wagons without giving us any plan or any prior notice at all. You have either forced the wagons and escort crews prepared by us to stand idle, thus making us waste our manpower and material, or put us in a situation in which we were compelled to alter our transport plans to suit you. Thus, you not only upset our own transport plans, but make it impossible for China and

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Viet Nam to co-ordinate their transport plans, thereby seriously affecting the normal movement of supplies to Viet Nam.

We have repeatedly raised objections to your violations of the agreements, but you have persistently refused to mend your ways. On September 2, Li Chiang, Vice-Minister of China's Commission for Economic Relations with Foreign Countries, met Kalinin and pointed out to him in all seriousness that by this practice you were trying to create a situation in which you could upset at will the transport plans of China and Viet Nam in case we agreed to accept such supplies and put up with your violations of agreements, or you could slander China as obstructing the transit of Soviet supplies to Viet Nam in case we did not do so. He declared that we are firmly opposed to these practices of yours, and demanded that you strictly abide by the agreements and work according to plan and that any change of plan should be made only with our prior consent. Kalinin replied, "The Soviet side promises that from now on it will take measures to observe all the points of the Protocol and all the conditions of the contract."

However, violations by your side have in no way

decreased. On the contrary, they have become more frequent and more serious. Thus, in September, 72 per cent of your despatches to China arrived either in the absence of prior plans or not in conformity with them.

Between September 18 and October 23; Chang Chun-ho raised the question of your despatching wagons without prior plans with Kalinin; Romanov and Shaitan on ten occasions; and he repeatedly stated that if you failed to take measures to solve this question, the Soviet side would have to bear full responsibility for any delays in transport. Shaitan said: "We have made a positive appraisal of the efforts made by the Chinese departments concerned in transporting Soviet deliveries in transit to Viet Nam. We share the worries of the Chinese comrades as a result of hindrances occurring through our fault." "We appreciate the great patience the Chinese side has shown with regard to such hindrances." "General Romanov and I have studied your remarks, found where the trouble lies, and asked the Director of the General Engineering Bureau of the Commission for Economic Relations with Foreign Countries to look into the matter personally and take effective measures to eliminate our shortcomings." "Please don't consider us incorrigible."

We appreciate what Comrade Shaitan told us. Unfortunately you have not stopped your practice of violating the transport agreements.

In your letter you boast of being "faithful to our internationalist duty" and "doing everything to support the Vietnamese people in their sacred struggle", and moreover you peremptorily assert that China is obstructing the transit of your supplies to Viet Nam. Supposing that were the case, one might ask: Why don't you use your numerous ocean-going vessels to ship your military supplies to Viet Nam? Why is it that you have not yet sent the naval vessels you promised the Vietnamese comrades in February directly to ports in Viet Nam, but instead want to transfer them to the Vietnamese comrades via Chinese ports? You try to justify yourselves by saying that the United States is enforcing a blockade against Viet Nam, that there is no common boundary between the Soviet Union and Viet Nam, and that the transport of supplies through Chinese territory is "the only practical channel". But is this true? Everybody knows that vessels of various countries are still able to enter and clear the ports of Viet Nam: Vessels from capitalist countries can enter, and so can those from socialist countries. Chinese

are not entirely absent either. You simply dare not use your own ships to transport military supplies in aid of the Vietnamese people. You are simply afraid of U.S. imperialism.

In short, your actions on the question of the transit of military supplies to Viet Nam testify fully to the following facts:

1. However much we try to help you transport military supplies to Viet Nam, you invariably make up lies and slander us. You have lied about us and slandered us from the outset, and you are still doing so now. It may be anticipated that you will continue to do so in the future. You have fallen so low that you have become professional liars, and you have decided to exploit the question of the transit of supplies to Viet Nam in order to invent lies about China. The U.S. imperialists and the reactionaries in various countries are now stirring up a new international adverse current against China. Your last letter in itself constitutes active participation in this anti-Chinese chorus.

2. While putting up a façade of aiding Viet Nam, you are actually sabotaging the cause of support for Viet Nam against U.S. aggression. You have set your

minds on creating difficulties for China and Viet Nam in their railway transport and on upsetting the normal transport of supplies to Viet Nam in your attempts to hamper the Chinese people's struggle to aid Viet Nam in her resistance to U.S. aggression.

3. Your aid to Viet Nam is given with ulterior motives. In involving yourselves in the question of Viet Nam and giving her certain amount of arms, you are trying to embellish yourselves, deceive the people of the Soviet Union and the world, and gain a say on this question so that you can strike a political bargain with the United States and drag the question into the orbit of your general line of Soviet-U.S. collaboration for world domination. It is in pursuit of these aims that you are using every means to oppose the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese people, who are firmly supporting Viet Nam in her resistance to U.S. aggression.

Comrades! Khrushchov has stepped into his grave by enforcing the general line of Soviet-U.S. collaboration for world domination, allying himself with the United States against China and selling out the revolutionary interests of the people of Viet Nam and other countries. In proceeding further along his

path, you will assuredly come to no good end. If you do not want to take the road to complete ruin, you must immediately give up your revisionist general line, honestly assist the Vietnamese people in their struggle against U.S. aggression and for national salvation, and stop the concoction of anti-Chinese slanders and all other anti-Chinese activities.

With fraternal greetings,

The Central Committee of the
Communist Party of China

ЦЕНТРАЛЬНОМУ КОМИТЕТУ
КОММУНИСТИЧЕСКОЙ ПАРТИИ КИТАЯ

Товарищи!

Вам известно, что Советский Союз оказывает военно-экономическую помощь вьетнамскому народу в его героической борьбе против американского империализма. Вы хорошо знаете, что вьетнамский народ переживает огромные трудности в этой борьбе, сражается не щадя своих сил. Для того, чтобы успешней сдерживать натиск американских интервентов, вьетнамские борцы за свободу и независимость своей родины нуждаются в современной военной технике. Верный своему интернациональному долгу, Советский Союз делает все для того, чтобы поддерживать вьетнамский народ в его священной борьбе. Мы прилагаем большие усилия для того, чтобы обеспечить выполнение просьб вьетнамских товарищей о поставке им военной техники.

К сожалению, с самого начала перевозок советских военных грузов во Вьетнам китайские власти стали создавать трудности в транспортировке советских военных грузов для сражающегося Вьетнама по территории КНР.

После того, как между Советским Союзом и ДРВ была до-

100-428091-

5325

стигнута договоренность об увеличении поставок военной техники и об ускорении ее доставки, представители китайской администрации чинят препятствия в транспортировке наших грузов для ДРВ. В этой связи мы хотели бы обратить ваше внимание на некоторые последние факты.

Поскольку единственно реальный путь транспортировки грузов в ДРВ проходит через территорию КНР, то наши органы в связи с ранее установившейся практикой еще 26 августа с.г. передали в Комитет по внешнеэкономическим связям КНР предложение оформить соответствующими документами порядок перевозок дополнительных партий советских военных грузов через территорию КНР в ДРВ.

Несмотря на то, что советские представители поставили в известность китайскую сторону о том, что эти дополнительные поставки производятся по срочной просьбе вьетнамских друзей, китайские власти долгое время не отвечали на наше предложение, а когда 7 октября с.г. представитель посольства СССР поставил перед зам. начальника I-го управления Комитета по внешнеэкономическим связям КНР Чжан Чунь-хэ вопрос об ускорении подписания этих обменных писем, последний заявил, что китайская сторона не будет принимать советские военные грузы для ДРВ до выяснения "какое военно-техническое имущество, намечаемое к поставке Советским Союзом в ДРВ в

3.

1965--1967 гг., необходимо вьетнамской стороне в первую очередь, в какие сроки она желает это имущество получить и какие имеются технические возможности для приема этой техники".

В соответствии с этим решением нашим представителям объявлено об отказе пропускать через территорию КНР ряда транспортов с нашей военной помощью Вьетнаму (это касается, в частности, транспортов с 10 военнотехническими мастерскими, а также 40 зенитными орудиями, хотя перевозка военнотехнического имущества осуществляется в соответствии с уже достигнутой ранее договоренностью между СССР, КНР и ДРВ).

Таким образом, представители китайских властей, с одной стороны, задерживают оформление соглашений об условиях перевозок советских военных грузов через КНР, а, с другой стороны, отказываются принимать к перевозке эти грузы под предлогом, что соответствующие документы еще не подписаны.

ЦК КПСС серьезно обеспокоен сложившимся положением, поскольку задержка с доставкой советских военных грузов в ДРВ создает дополнительные трудности для героического вьетнамского народа. В условиях, когда американский империализм организует блокаду Вьетнама, территория КНР является связывающим звеном между ДРВ и Советским Союзом. У Советского Союза и ДРВ нет общих

4.

границ, и единственно реальный в этих условиях путь доставки военной помощи братскому вьетнамскому народу от Советского Союза и других социалистических стран проходит через территорию КНР.

Этого обстоятельства не может не учитывать руководство Китая. В свое время оно приняло на себя соответствующие обязательства. В частности, в беседе с т. Косыгиным т. Мао Цзэ-дун обещал, что китайские власти будут всячески содействовать быстрой доставке советской военной техники во Вьетнам. Сейчас же вопреки заверениям т. Мао Цзэ-дуна китайские власти чинят препятствия в организации бесперебойной транспортировки наших грузов в ДРВ.

Центральный Комитет КПСС выражает надежду, что ЦК КПК объективно и внимательно разберется во всех этих фактах и примет безотлагательные меры к обеспечению транспортировки через китайскую территорию советских военных грузов для ДРВ.

С коммунистическим приветом

Ц К К П С С

21 октября 1965 года

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : Mr. Conrad *JWC*

DATE: January 26, 1966

FROM : C. F. Downing *CFD/pup*

SUBJECT: SOLO
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Wick _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

fin
On 1/26/66, the New York Office furnished the text of a message the informant desired to send and requested that it be enciphered. The cipher text was furnished to New York on the same day.

The plain text and cipher text are attached.

ACTION:

For information.

Enclosure

ENCLOSURE

- 1 - Mr. Conrad
- 2 - Mr. Sullivan (Attention: Mr. J. A. Sizoo, Mr. W. G. Shaw)
- 1 - Mr. Downing
- 1 - Mr. Newpher
- 1 - Mr. Paddock

28
HS:dek
(7)
pup

100-428091-5326

6 FEB 1 1966

F-15
65 FEB 3 1966

1/26/66

WILL YOU DESIGNATE PLACE WHERE COLOUR PRINTS ARE TO BE PICKED
UP OR SHALL I SPRING.

54798 98713 56824 24992 05546 11662 13922 02013 16753 92988
23924 13708 78329 94801 46434 16473 88398 72153 65554 69284
53349 90165

ENCLOSURE

100-428091-5326

SAC, New York. (100-134637-A)

1/31/66

Director, FBI (100-428091)

1 - Shawach

SOLO
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Reurlet 1/25/66 requesting authority to maintain from \$15,000 to \$25,000 of Solo funds on the premises of your office for the use of NY 694-S* in emergency situations.

The Bureau does not see the necessity for this proposed course of action, particularly in view of the fact that Solo funds have been handled by NY 694-S* for approximately eight years, and the need to maintain Solo funds on the premises of your office has not arisen during that period. Your proposal to maintain several thousand dollars of Solo funds in your office poses a great many problems and places a responsibility on your office far beyond the exigencies of this matter.

As an alternate course of action to cope with this problem, explore thoroughly with NY 694-S* the possibility of informant maintaining a safe within his home or office where informant could maintain a ready source of Solo funds, approximately \$10,000 or \$15,000 for use in case of emergencies. This type of arrangement would appear to satisfy Gus Hall who assumes that NY 694-S* has Solo funds secreted in his home or office.

Promptly advise the Bureau as to the results of your discussion with NY 694-S* concerning this matter, and include your observations and recommendations as to the suggested alternate course of action.

WGS:pah
(4)

MAILED 6

JAN 28 1966

COMM-FBI

REC-4

100-428091-

10 JAN 28 1966

5327

NOTE:

New York's request to maintain Solo funds on the office premises was made as a result of a suggestion by NY 694-S*. Informant noted that Gus Hall, who controls the expenditure of Solo funds, does not want these funds maintained in a bank and assumes that the informant has the funds secreted in his home or office. On

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Wick _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

(NOTE CONTINUED PAGE TWO)

FEB 1 1966 XEROX

MAILED 10 FEB 1 1966 TELETYPE UNIT

Letter to SAC, New York
Re: SOLO
100-428091

NOTE CONTINUED:

occasions Hall has become enraged because informant was not able to immediately comply with his request for funds. As a result, New York has requested authority to keep Solo funds in the office safe where these funds would be readily accessible to NY 694-S* for emergency use. The granting of this request appears to be fraught with danger, and New York is being instructed to discuss an alternate course of action with NY 694-S*.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan *WCS*

FROM : Mr. F.J. Baumgardner *FB*

SUBJECT: SOLO
INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST

DATE: January 20, 1966

1 - DeLoach
1 - Administrative
Division
1 - Sullivan
1 - Baumgardner
1 - Shaw

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Wick _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

for In the attached letter dated 1/18/66, Special Agent in Charge, New York, advised that unless advised to the contrary, Special Agent George Edwin Jones would be designated as the alternate Agent in handling NY 694-S*.

My memorandum of 12/7/65 pertaining to this matter pointed out that, although Special Agent Jones possessed the necessary experience and qualifications for this assignment, he was in a limited duty status as a result of having suffered a stroke and it was not deemed judicious to utilize him as the alternate contacting Agent.

Special Agent in Charge has now advised that Special Agent Jones has been certified by his personal physician for arduous and strenuous duties. On 1/18/66 the examining doctor at the Government facility also certified Special Agent Jones for full duty status.

OBSERVATIONS:

Special Agent Jones, prior to suffering a stroke, served as the alternate contacting Agent for NY 694-S* and did a commendable job. NY 694-S*, who at times is difficult to handle, has always enjoyed a pleasant relationship with Special Agent Jones.

RECOMMENDATION:

That Special Agent Jones be designated as the alternate contacting Agent for NY 694-S*. If you approve, no additional action is necessary since New York's request in that regard was submitted on an unless advised to the contrary basis.

100-428091

WGS:pah
(6)

Enclosure

ENCLOSURE

REC-10

100-428091-5328

EX-100

6 FEB 2 1966

65 FEB 11 1966

REC. UNIT

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

DATE: 1/18/66

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS - C

ReNYlet 12/2/65 advising that UACB SA GEORGE EDWIN JONES would replace SA JOHN DENNIS O'CONNELL as the alternate agent for NY 694-S*.

ReBulet 12/8/65 in which the Bureau advised that although SA JONES appeared to possess the necessary qualifications for this assignment, he was in limited duty status and it was not deemed judicious to use SA JONES.

Please be advised that SA JONES has received a letter from his personal physician certifying him for arduous and strenuous duties. Please be further advised that on 1/13/66 SA JONES underwent a physical examination at the U.S. Government facility. On 1/18/66 the examining doctor certified SA JONES for full duty. The Bureau is being advised of the results of this annual physical examination by separate communication and SA JONES is being removed from limited duty status.

In view of the foregoing and UACB, SA JONES will replace former SA O'CONNELL as the alternate agent for handling NY 694-S*.

2 - Bureau (RM)
1 - New York #41

WM:IM
(3)

EX-100
REC-10

THREE
ENCLOSURE

100-428091-5328

2-2
5 JAN-19 1966

INTL SEC.



5010-108

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Best copy
available.

1/27/65

ST
ALINTEL

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)
FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (100-14931)
SUBJECT: NIKOLAI NIKOLAEVICH TALANOV
IS - R

Subject was observed entering the SMU, 190 East 67th St., NYC, on Monday, 1/26/66, at 7:27 PM, carrying a suitcase, by SAs who man the permanent observation post in the vicinity of the SMU. He has been subsequently observed on a daily basis entering and leaving the SMU.

Subject, who is First Secretary of the SMU and a known KGB employee, last departed the U.S. for Russia on 12/16/65, aboard KLM flight number 644.

Above being furnished for information of the Bureau.

4 - Bureau (RM)
(1 - 100-428091) (SOLO)
1 - New York (100-14931)
1 - New York

FVR:ble
(8)

100-428091-
NOT RECORDED
176 FEB 3 1966

66 FEB 7 1966

ORIGINAL FILED IN

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : Mr. Conrad *JWC*

DATE: January 28, 1966

FROM : C. F. Downing *CFD/Rup*

SUBJECT: *SOLO*
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Wick _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan *J* _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

for B.T.
Captioned case involves the Bureau's highly valuable confidential informant NY 694-S* who has been receiving communications transmitted to him by radio.

On 1/28/66, transmissions were heard by the Bureau's radio station at Midland at which time a message, NR 424 GR 30, was intercepted.

The plain text and cipher text are attached.

The New York Office is aware of the contents.

ACTION:

For information.

Enclosure

- 1 - Mr. Conrad
- 2 - Mr. Sullivan (Attention: Mr. J. A. Sizoo, Mr. W. G. Shaw)
- 1 - Mr. Downing
- 1 - Mr. Newpher
- 1 - Mr. Paddock

HS
HS:dek
(7)

10
ENCLOSURE

REC-3 100-428091-5329

6 FEB 3 1966

F140
65 FEB 9 1966

NR 424 GR 30

1/28/66

WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE YOU AT SISTER CATHERINE'S CATHARINE ON FEBRUARY #1#ST. C/N FIRM TODAY IF YOU ARE READY TO COME.

NR 424 GR 30

1/28/66

70752 45773 40889 86358 45684 07175 18190 02236 60074 68349

82529 93646 11901 22514 30515 97075 39514 78077 21981 95100

20297 05889 70670 59706 41480 51147 08115 58742 70089 68562

ENCLOSURE

100-428091-5329

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

DATE: 1/25/66

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637-A)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS - C

ReNYlet to Bureau 1/5/66 setting out the most recent accounting of SOLO funds maintained by NY 694-S*. The Bureau will note that as of 12/31/65 there was a balance maintained of \$1,003,533.78. Of this amount \$678,609.00 was being maintained by NY 694-S* in two safe deposit vaults. The Bureau will also note that \$215,000.00 was being kept by the NYO in a safe deposit box already being rented by the NYO.

In the past it has been the practice of the NYO to require NY 694-S* to take all of the money available as soon as it has been processed by the NYO and the Bureau. During the past few months when the question of taking additional money had been brought up, NY 694-S* evidenced a reluctance because the existing boxes rented by him have been loaded to capacity and in order for him to accept additional money it would be necessary to rent an additional box. He has shown a reluctance to do this without being too specific as to the reason therefor. It is felt that the informant possibly feels that he does not want the responsibility of managing an additional box although this is not certain.

With reference to the \$215,000.00 maintained by the NYO, this has not been processed completely for the reason that we do not have sufficient space to deposit additional bills. Of this amount \$120,000.00 is in \$100 bills; \$40,000.00 is in \$50 bills and \$55,000.00 is in \$20 bills. The informant cannot dispose of anything above \$20 denominations and therefore it is necessary to convert the \$100 and \$50 denominations into \$20's. In the absence of space to place additional \$20 denominations if the money were to be converted, NYO has not completed the processing.

For the additional information of the Bureau, the money furnished the informant is in stacks of \$2,000 in \$20 bills. The NYO maintains

- 2 - Bureau (RM)
- 1 - New York (#41)

WM:IM
(3)

REC 5

EX-102

6 FEB 3 1966

NY 100-134637-A

Xerox copies of these bills in the same order as contained in the stacks. When the informant passes out the money, he furnishes us with the first and last serial number in the stack and by referring to the Xerox copies, the NYO is able to identify each bill which he passes out. This mode of operation is necessary since on most occasions the informant does not have time to record all serial numbers especially when he passes out large sums of money.

It will be noted from relet that the informant maintains in excess of \$100,000.00 of SOLO funds in checking accounts. It is appreciated that rather than keeping additional money in the safe deposit vault he could deposit the same in checking accounts. This would not be to the advantage of either the informant or the Bureau since upon passing out the money he would not have time to record all the serial numbers and thus would make ineffective our tracing operations for that portion of the money. Therefore, in the opinion of the NYO the solution to the inadequacy of space is not in increasing the amount maintained in checking accounts.

On 1/25/66 a radio message was received that money allotted to the CPUSA by the Russians for the year 1966 has arrived in the United States and at least a portion of it will be furnished to NY 694-S* during February. Based on past experience this could amount to in excess of a quarter of a million dollars for the first instalment. Assuming this to be a fact, the Bureau will readily see that action must be taken with reference to depositories in order to handle all this money. The safe deposit boxes currently being maintained by the NYO are not of sufficient size to handle any more money. In addition, these boxes are used to store valuables both in security and criminal matters. Due to the scope encompassed as indicated above, frequent access is had to these boxes.

The NYO proposes that a safe deposit box be rented by the NYO for the exclusive use of SOLO funds. This would result in having sufficient space to keep this money and without the necessity of constantly putting pressure on the informant to take it from us. It is realized that this will result in the FBI maintaining large sums of SOLO funds for an extended period of time. This would be to our advantage in keeping an inventory of the outstanding money in the SOLO operation.

As the Bureau is aware, the NYO does not have access to the boxes maintained by the informant and must rely entirely on the informant making these boxes available for any inventory.

NY 100-134637-A

It is believed that much of the reluctance on the part of the informant to inventory these boxes has been the time required at the bank to check the money, which time is considerable. By reducing the money the informant maintains in the vaults it would cut down this time a great deal.

It should be noted that this suggestion is not in any way intended to hamstring the informant in his handling of the money as we would furnish the informant any amount of money he requested at any time. Rather, the intent is to avoid forcing the money on NY 694-S* when he does not have sufficient space to maintain it. Further, it is not intended that this possible switch in policy be discussed with NY 694-S* but rather we start maintaining more money in our boxes by avoiding forcing the money on him. No problem is anticipated in this regard.

Based on the above comments, the NYO requests authority from the Bureau to rent a safe deposit box, the rental not to exceed \$150.00 a year. It is believed that one can be rented for approximately \$100.00 but this depends entirely upon the availability of boxes at the bank at any particular time.

There have been occasions in the past whereby a need has existed for NY 694-S* to furnish CP officials money over the weekend. This occurred within the past two weeks while CG 5824-S* was in New York. It was necessary for both informants to put off the transfer of the money until a weekday due to the inaccessibility of funds as these funds were located in a bank. It has been suggested by CG 5824-S* and NY 694-S* that NYO maintain approximately \$15,000.00 to \$25,000.00 on the NYO premises so that these funds would be available in an emergency over the weekend. They feel this desirable as GUS HALL is not aware that the money is kept in a bank and assumes that it is hidden or buried in premises maintained by the informant or other individuals. The informants also feel that it would not be desirable for HALL to get the impression that it is maintained in a bank. He would object to this. By keeping the money in a place which would be accessible over the weekend the informants feel that HALL then would never become suspicious as to the exact location of the bulk of the money. The NYO feels that their thinking in this regard is sound and has considerable merit.

If the Bureau authorizes the NYO to maintain up to \$25,000.00 on the premises, this money would be kept in a safe, the combination

NY 100-134637-A

of which would be limited to a few people, namely, Assistant Director in Charge, the SACs in charge of the Administrative Division and the Security Division, and Supervisor [redacted] [redacted] If any occasion arises for removing money from the safe over the weekend, one of these four individuals would have to handle it. It is further anticipated that the above-mentioned safe would be located in the Gun Vault of the NYO. An appropriate log would also be maintained for this money.

b6
b7C

The Bureau is requested to authorize the above suggestion.

F B I

Date: 1/28/66

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via AIRTEL REGISTERED
(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)
FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637)
SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

for
S.I.
On 1/28/66, there was received from the Soviets,
via radio, a ciphered-partially coded message, the plain
text of which is as follows:

"We would like to see you at Drop Catherine
on February 1. Confirm today if you are
ready to come."

FD-3 - Bureau (RM)
1 - Chicago (134-46-Sub B) (AM RM)
1 - NY 134-91 (INV) (41)
1 - NY 105-14931-Sub C (TALANOV) (341)
1 - NY 100-134637 (41)

ACB:msb
(8)

REC 5

100-428091-5331
6 FEB 3 1966

Approved: _____

65 FEB 9 1966

Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Date: 1/24/66

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)Via AIRTEL REGISTERED
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)
 FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637)
 SUBJECT: SOLO
 IS - C

ReNYairtel, 1/21/66, reflecting that the Soviets advised that they had a letter for GUS HALL, which they desired ~~to~~ JAMES JACKSON read in order that he may report on same to HALL.

On 1/23/66, CG 5824-S* furnished the following information to SA ALEXANDER C. BURLINSON:

On 1/23/66, GUS HALL advised CG 5824-S* that JAMES JACKSON had gone to the headquarters of the Soviet UN Delegation on 1/22/66, and was permitted to make notes on a document read to him by the Soviets. As reported to HALL by JACKSON, the Soviets did not ~~mention~~ ^{describe} the title or nature of the document from which they were reading, and they were very careful in the manner in which they allowed JACKSON to take notes. The pad upon which he was writing was taken from him as soon as he completed making his notes.

- 3 - BUREAU (100-428091) (RM)
 1 - CHICAGO (134-46-SubB) (AM-RM)
 1 - NY 66-6989 (INV) (41)
 1 - NY 105-14931-Sub C (N. TALANOV) (341)
 1 - NY 100-134637 (41)

ACB:rvs
 (8)

REC 5 100-428091-5332

EX-102 6 FEB 1 1966

Approved: _____

Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

65 FEB 9 1966

NY 100-134637

HALL stated that document, according to JACKSON, was 14 pages long and for the most part was a resume of relations between the Soviets and the Chinese, reflecting the Soviet opinion that the Chinese are still obstinate and polemical. In this document the Soviets charge the Chinese with disrupting the solidarity of world communism, of preventing the Soviets from transporting war material to North Vietnam, of advocating war instead of peaceful coexistence, and of inciting a world war that would result in a confrontation with the USA.

HALL stated that there was a significant phrase in the document which read "we will not tolerate Chinese interference in the internal affairs of the CPSU." HALL stated that his interpretation of this statement was that apparently the Chinese have been attempting to disrupt the CPSU, and must exert some influence within the CPSU. HALL also stated that he was surprised that the document made no mention of ALEKSANDR SHELEPIN, Soviet Deputy Premier, who was recently in Vietnam.

It is anticipated that the above-mentioned document will be made available to NY 694-S* within the next few days. The Bureau and Chicago will be furnished a copy thereof as soon as possible.

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

SAC, New York (100-134637)

2/3/66

Director, FBI (100-428091)

1 - Shaw

SOLO
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Reurlet 1/28/66 (copy to Chicago).

Relet recommends that the Bureau authorize NY 694-S* to reimburse himself from Solo funds for expenditures made in behalf of informant's financial commitment to the Communist Party.

The Bureau has no objection to this arrangement. As a matter of fact, both NY 694-S* and CG 5824-S* should be encouraged to utilize Solo funds to reimburse themselves for expenditures made in behalf of the Party, particularly on the cost of informants' transportation while on Party business. The Bureau, of course, should be advised in the monthly Solo funds letters concerning such expenditures and exact use made of such funds should be set forth.

1 - Chicago (134-46 Sub B)

REC-65 100-428091-5333

6 FEB 3 1966

WGS:pah
(5)

MAILED 7
FEB 3 1966
COMM-FBI

NOTE:

Party leader Gus Hall recently inquired of NY 694-S* as to whether he and his "apparatus" were in good standing relative to dues, payments, contributions, etc. NY 694-S*, although not paying dues to the Party, has over the years made substantial financial contributions. NY 694-S* advised that Hall would expect him to make a contribution of at least \$1300 for the year 1965. Informant pointed out that in view of the fact that he had recently been hospitalized for an extended period he does not have the necessary finances to make such a contribution. Informant has requested permission to utilize the Solo funds in his possession to take care of his 1965 financial commitment to the Party. There is no objection to this. Informants should make more liberal use of Solo funds to cover such expenses, rather than having the Bureau reimburse them.

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Wick _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

PMW

MAIL ROOM ☒ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

WCL

FEB 3 1966

~~TOP SECRET~~

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

(IS) 100-428091

BY LIAISON

Solo

1 - Liaison
1 - Shaw

Date: January 28, 1966

To: Director
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Department of State

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director

Subject: SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE

*1-31-66
declassified
as per*

A source which has furnished reliable information in the past recently made available two documents, one dated October 18, 1965, and the other dated November 5, 1965, both addressed to the Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The documents reportedly were sent by the Central Committee, Communist Party of China, and relate to the Sino-Soviet dispute.

There is enclosed for your information one copy each of the above-mentioned documents. The enclosed documents are not to be disseminated outside of your Department.

Because of the sensitive nature of the source which furnished the above-mentioned documents, this letter is classified "~~Top Secret~~."

Enclosures (2)

REC-65

100-428091-5334

1 - Director (Enclosures - 2) BY LIAISON
Central Intelligence Agency

6 FEB 3 1966

Attention: Deputy Director, Plans

WGS:pah
(6)

pah

~~TOP SECRET~~

(SEE NOTE PAGE TWO)

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Wick _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

FEB 3

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

WGS

CHOPIN

55 FEB 7 1966

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT ☐

1 copy destroyed
65-52604

~~TOP SECRET~~

Director
Bureau of Intelligence and Research

NOTE:

Classified "~~Top Secret~~" since the disclosure of data furnished by source (NY 694-S*) could reasonably result in the identification of source who is of continuing value and such revelation could result in exceptionally grave damage to the Nation. See New York airtel 1/24/66 captioned "Solo, IS - C," which discloses that the documents from the Chinese CP to the Soviet CP were forwarded by the CP of Canada to the CPUSA via the Solo communication apparatus operated by NY 694-S*. The documents which deal with the Sino-Soviet dispute were previously furnished to us by [] in 12/65. [] requested that no additional dissemination be made. b7D

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

FROM : *[Signature]* SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

DATE: 1/28/66

Baumgardner
5-Shaker

On 1/27/66, NY 694-S* advised as follows:

fu

During a meeting with GUS HALL on 1/26/66, shortly before HALL left New York for a trip to the West Coast, HALL asked the informant whether or not he and his "apparatus" were in "good standing" as regards dues payments, contributions, etc. HALL at the moment was referring to the fact that there would be a general dues assessment with respect to the next convention of the CP, USA.

NY 694-S* stated that over the years, despite the fact that he did not pay dues as such to the Party, he nevertheless has made substantial contributions to the Party. He stated that in view of the fact that he recently has had heavy expenses with regard to his hospitalization, he feels that he cannot personally make a contribution to the Party for the year 1965, as HALL anticipates he will. He stated that his contribution includes that of his wife who, in HALL's opinion, by reason of assisting the informant in his typing work, is also a member of the Party. NY 694-S* stated that his contribution to the Party for the year 1965 should be at least \$1,300.00 and that in view of the anticipated assessment in connection with the coming convention, he must make a further contribution at a later date.

12

Informant stated that he feels that in the future he should reimburse himself for such contributions

1/28/66

2-Bureau (100-428091) (RM)
1-Chicago (134-46 Sub B) (AM RM)
1-NY 134-91 (41)
1-NY 100-134637 (41)

REC 36

100-428091-5335

ACB:eac
(5)

not to NY 100-134637
2-266
not: p. 4

FEB 4 1966



FEB 9 1966

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

NY 100-134637

to the Party from Solo funds in his possession. He pointed out that over the years he has contributed large sums of money to the Party, but that now he feels that he should be reimbursed for such expenditures out of the Solo funds in his custody.

The NYO sees no objection to this arrangement and recommends that the Bureau authorize the informant to reimburse himself for such expenditures as above described from Solo funds.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091) DATE: 1/26/66

FROM : *JFM* SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637A)

SUBJECT: *for* SOLO
IS-C *S/Sheriff*

ReNYlet, 1/5/66, copy to Chicago, reporting transactions in Solo funds during the month of December, 1965.

The NYO inadvertently reported that the amount paid by NY 694-S* on 12/17/65, to LENA SCHERER was \$10,000, whereas said amount was \$20,000. The balance on hand, therefore, should be recorded as \$993,533.78 and the amount of money deposited in the vault of the 67 Broad Street Branch of the Chemical Bank - New York Trust Company, as \$434,000.00.

handled 2/3/66 GEC It is requested that the Bureau and Chicago correct the referenced letter to reflect the above-mentioned changes in the December, 1965 accounting report. */// P*

REC-18

1-904
100-428091-5336

6 FEB 8 1966

2-Bureau (100-428091) (RM)
1-Chicago (134-46 Sub B) (AM RM)
1-NY 134-91 (INV) (41)
1-NY 100-128861 Sub B. (CP, USA RESERVE FUNDS) (42)
1-NY 100-134637A (41)

ACB:eac
(6)



65 FEB 9 1966

F46 Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

DATE: 2/1/66

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub F)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS - C

ReBulet dated May 4, 1960, and CGlet dated January 5, 1966.

ReBulet instructed Chicago to set forth a monthly accounting of all receipts and disbursements of Solo and CP, USA Reserve Funds in possession of CG 5824-S*. Set forth below is such an accounting:

Balance of funds in possession of
CG 5824-S* as of December 31, 1965

Solo

Maintained in cash in safe deposit box, Mid-America National Bank, Chicago, Illinois (this money transferred January 12, 1966, from funds previously maintained at the First National Bank of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois, and the Michigan Avenue National Bank, Chicago, Illinois)

\$110,000.00

Maintained in cash in safe deposit box, Michigan Avenue National Bank, Chicago, Illinois

58,543.71

CP, USA Reserve Funds

Maintained in cash in safe deposit box, Michigan Avenue National Bank, Chicago, Illinois

4,048.00

Total

\$172,591.71

1-904 94D

②-Bureau (RM)

2-New York (RM)

(1 - 100-134637) (SOLO)

(1 - 100-128861) (CP, USA - Reserve Funds) FEB 8 1966

1-Chicago

RWH:MDW

65 FEB 9 1966

REC-18

100-428091-5337

CG 134-46 Sub F

Additions

Solo

None

CP, USA Reserve Funds

Returned mid-January, 1966, by LEM HARRIS as unused portion of monies provided for expenses connected with two trips to Washington, D.C., December, 1965, to arrange for visas for Vietnam delegation

\$52.26

Disbursements

Solo

Disbursements at New York City, December 30, 1965-January 4, 1966:

In cash to GUS HALL \$1,300.00

For pens, fillers, books, and similar items provided to ISADORE NEEDLEMAN as gifts to be presented to CP officials abroad during NEEDLEMAN's trip, commencing January 3, 1966 50.00

To NEEDLEMAN to provide as gift to HARRY YARIS, Warsaw, Poland 10.00

For purchase of items at HALL's request including necklace for [redacted] and transistor radio for [redacted] 121.00

Total \$1,481.00

On January 8, 1966, to LOU DISKIN, Modern Book Store, Chicago, for books, pamphlets, and related material to be sent abroad 60.00

On January 8, 1966, as reimbursement for purchase price of pearl necklace ordered by HALL for [redacted] 105.22

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

CG 134-46 Sub F

On January 8, 1966, as reimbursement
for purchase price of shoes for GUS
HALL \$ 42.83

On January 9, 1966, as purchase price
for items sent to New York for CP, USA
functionaries, including liquor 41.56

On January 11, 1966, to MAX WEINSTEIN
as back salary 500.00

On January 15, 1966, to MAX WEINSTEIN
as balance of back salary and expenses
due through February 1, 1966 500.00

On January 27, 1966, sent as baby gift
to SUSAN KLAYMAN, Toronto, Ontario,
Canada, daughter of WILLIAM KASHTAN,
General Secretary, CP of Canada 15.00

Total \$2,745.61

CP, USA Reserve Funds

None

Balance of funds in possession of
CG 5824-S* as of January 31, 1966

Solo

Maintained in cash in safe deposit
box, Mid-American National Bank,
Chicago, Illinois \$110,000.00

Maintained in cash in safe deposit
box, Michigan Avenue National Bank,
Chicago, Illinois 55,798.10

CP, USA Reserve Funds

Maintained in cash in safe deposit
box, Michigan Avenue National Bank,
Chicago, Illinois 4,100.26

Total \$169,898.36

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637A)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

DATE: 2/1/66

Remylets 1/5/66 and 1/26/66.

The records of the NYO reflect the following transactions regarding SOLO funds during the month of January 1966:

Credits

1/1/66 On Hand \$993,533.78

Debits

1/18/66 To LENA SCHERER:
For 8 weeks operating
expenses of
"The Worker" \$24,000.00
For current operating
expenses of
"Freedom Ways" 5,000.00
For current operating
expenses of CPUSA
National Office 11,000.00 40,000.00

- 1- 904 920
- 2 - Bureau (RM)
 - 1 - Chicago (134-46-Sub B) (RM)
 - 1 - NY 134-91 (INV) (41)
 - 1 - NY 100-128861-Sub B (CPUSA-RESERVE FUNDS) (42)
 - 1 - NY 100-134637A (41)

ACB:msb
(6)

REC- 18

100-428091-5338

6 FEB 8 1966



5010-108

FEB 9 1966

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

NY 100-134637

1/18/66	To NY 694-S* as reimbursement for advance from personal funds to GUS HALL on 11/13/65	\$ 800.00
1/26/66	To GUS HALL for "Peoples World" and current operating expenses of West Coast CPUSA District Offices	10,000.00
1/26/66	To LEM HARRIS for CPUSA real estate investments	10,000.00
1/26/66	To ISIDORE NEEDLEMAN for CPUSA investment in stock market	1,000.00
	Balance	<u>\$931,733.78</u>

The above balance, \$931,733.78, as of 1/31/66, is maintained as follows, according to NY 694-S*:

Vault - 67 Broad St. Branch of C.B.N.Y.T. Co.	\$393,200.00
Vault - 20 Pine St. Branch of C.B.N.Y.T. Co.	213,609.00
JACK BROOKS regular checking account #1 (661-228919), 20 Pine St. Branch of C.B.N.Y.T.	33,924.78
JACK BROOKS regular checking account #2 (001-232835), 20 Pine St., Branch of C.B.N.Y.T.	36,000.00
JACK BROOKS regular checking account #3, (001-237942), 20 Pine St. Branch of C.B.N.Y.T.	40,000.00
NYO Vault at National City Bank, 72nd St. and 3rd Ave.	<u>215,000.00</u>
	\$931,733.78

Note: "C.B.N.Y.T." above is Chemical Bank-New York Trust Co.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : Mr. Conrad *JWC*

DATE: February 2, 1966

FROM : C. F. Downing *CFD*

SUBJECT: SOLO
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Wick _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan ☒ _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

Captioned case involves the Bureau's highly valuable confidential informant NY694-S* who has been receiving communications transmitted to him by radio.

fu On 2/2/66, transmissions were heard by the Bureau's radio station at Midland at scheduled times and frequencies but no messages were transmitted.

ACTION:

For information.

- 1 - Mr. Conrad
- 2 - Mr. Sullivan (Attention: Mr. J. A. Sizoo, Mr. W. G. Shaw)
- 1 - Mr. Downing
- 1 - Mr. Newpher
- 1 - Mr. Paddock

HS HS:cjs *CJS*
(7)

REC- 18

100-428091-5339

6 FEB 8 1966

65 FEB 9 1966 *FEB*

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

DATE: 2/3/66

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS - C

On January 27, 1966, CG 5824-S* advised
SAs RICHARD W. HANSEN and WALTER A. BOYLE that he had, on
that date, sent to WILLIAM KASHTAN, General Secretary,
Communist Party (CP) of Canada, a brief note directed to
a mail drop address in Toronto, Ontario, which had previously
been provided by KASHTAN. Set forth below is the text of
the note CG 5824-S* sent to KASHTAN, together with certain
information added as parenthetical comments which give
additional clarity to the content of this note:

January 27, 1966

Dear Bill (KASHTAN, General Secretary,
CP of Canada),

Herb (GUS HALL) and I want to extend our
congratulations to the new grandfather. We have
sent a separate hello and greeting (a cash gift
of \$15.00 by mail) to your daughter (SUE KLAYMAN).

Thank you for the material on the family
quarrel (letters of the CP of China dated October 18
and November 5, 1965, received from KASHTAN via
New York Solo drop). Even though as you said it
was stale, it was quite useful to us. Did you see
the reply of the other family (CP, Soviet Union),
obviously to this, which brought matters up to
date? We may see it one of these days.

- 2 - Bureau (RM)
1 - New York (RM)
1 - Chicago

RWH/mes
(4)

EX 109

REC 11

FEB 1 10 55 AM '66

6 FEB 9 1966

COMMUNIST DIA
REC'D

65 FEB 10 1966

CG 134-46 Sub B

I suppose our friend H. (HYMAN LUMER) gave you a run-down on our last get-together (National Committee meeting). In any case, some of it may appear in print soon, especially Herb's (GUS HALL's report) contribution and, of course, the announcement about our wedding (National Convention). Should you see H., tell him that the magazine ("World Marxist Review") with which your friend Alf (DEWHURST, CP of Canada representative to "World Marxist Review", Prague, Czechoslovakia) is working has asked for that article from him which he had promised. I do not know what it is all about. He might enlighten us, and he may be able to make some inquiries through your local office (Toronto office of "World Marxist Review") of magazine via telegram or air mail.

With best regards and greetings,

Michael (CG 5824-S*)

In response to the above noted communication of January 27, 1966, CG 5824-S* advised on February 2, 1966, that he had just received the following communication from WILLIAM KASHTAN in a drop he maintained in Chicago. This communication, together with parenthetical comments made by the source which give additional clarity to the communication, was as follows:

January 31, 1966

Dear Michael (CG 5824-S*),

Thanks for your note and good wishes. As it happens we had an opportunity of seeing the latest reply (document of the CP, Soviet Union) which is more or less of a summing up of past events. But the problem (differences between the CP, Soviet Union and the CP of China) still remains

CG 134-46 Sub B

as acute as ever, and will have to be dealt with by arguing against wrong positions while patiently working for unity of action. There are no short cuts here, that's obvious.

Met your friend H. (HYMAN LUMER) and showed him the above and also gave him your message regarding a promised article.

Apparently the pause (KASHTAN may be referring to the Viet Nam situation) is over and hot times are here again.

Haven't seen Herbert's (GUS HALL's) contribution (report to National Committee, CP, USA) but hope to in a few days. All the best for a good and happy wedding (convention). We are beginning to prepare for one (convention) here also.

As ever,

B. (WILLIAM KASHTAN)

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

2/9/66

Airtel

1 - Shaw

To: SACs, Chicago (134-46 Sub B) (Enclosures - 2)
New York (100-134637) (Enclosures - 3)

From: Director, FBI (100-428091)

SOLO

INTERNAL SECURITY - C

ReCGairtel 1/31/66, copy to New York, enclosing two Russian-language documents and requesting translation in form suitable to be turned over to CG 5824-S* and NY 694-S*, who in turn may furnish the translation to Gus Hall.

Enclosed herewith for New York are the original and two copies of the translation requested in reairtel. There are also enclosed for Chicago two copies of the translation. It should be noted that the translation was prepared on unwatermarked paper and is error-free. Your offices should carefully review the enclosed translation to insure that it has been prepared in the style and manner that would normally be available to CG 5824-S* and NY 694-S*. In the event that your offices believe that the manner in which the enclosed translation was prepared at the Bureau could conceivably jeopardize the security of the informants, the translation should be retyped.

MAILED 25
FEB 9 1966
COMM-FBI

WGS:pah
(6)

REC-19 100-428091-5341

EX-117

6 FEB 10 1966

NOTE:

Translation is of 2 letters, one dated 9/18/65 and the other dated 10/21/65. Both were sent by the Central Committee, CP of the Soviet Union, to the Central Committee, CP of China, and deal with the Sino-Soviet controversy. We previously received the translations of these letters from [redacted] who also furnished the translations to CIA.

b7D

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Wick _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

65 FEB 11 1966

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : Mr. Conrad *JWC*

DATE: February 9, 1966

FROM: *C. F. Downing*

SUBJECT: SOLO
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Wick _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

Captioned case involves the Bureau's highly valuable confidential informant NY 694-S* who has been receiving communications transmitted to him by radio.

On 2/9/66, transmissions were heard by the Bureau's radio station at Midland at scheduled times and frequencies but no messages were transmitted.

ACTION:

For information.

- 1 - Mr. Conrad
- 2 - Mr. Sullivan (Attention: Mr. J. A. Sizoo, Mr. W. G. Shaw)
- 1 - Mr. Downing
- 1 - Mr. Newpher
- 1 - Mr. Paddock

HS:dek
(7)
HS:dek

REC-3

100-428091-5342

6 FEB 11 1966

FJ4
65 FEB 15 1966

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

DATE: 2/3/66

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637A)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

ReBulet 1/31/66, instructing the NYO to explore thoroughly with NY 694-S* the possibility of the informant's maintaining a safe within his home or office where he could maintain a ready source of SOLO funds, approximately \$10,000. or \$15,000., for use in case of emergency.

Informant has advised that he considers a safe in his home or office an open invitation to burglars, and suggested instead that a strongbox be purchased which he may conceal somewhere in his home. He stated he would handle this matter himself.

The NYO sees no objection to this suggestion since the Bureau does not desire SOLO money maintained at the NYO.

2 - Bureau (RM)
1 - NY 134-91 (ADM) (41)
1 - NY 100-134637A (41)

ACB:msb
(4)

REC-3

100-428091-5343

6 FEB 11 1966

EX-102



5010-108

FEB 15 1966

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

SAC, New York (100-134637)

1/31/66

EX-104

REC-3

Director, FBI (100-428091) 5344

1 - DeLoach
1 - Sullivan
1 - Baumgardner
1 - Shaw

SOLO
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Reurlet 1/25/66 requesting authority for your office to rent a safe-deposit box for the exclusive use of Solo funds.

The Bureau is in agreement with your comments regarding the need to maintain a safe-deposit box for the exclusive use of Solo funds. Authority is granted to expend up to \$100 per year for the rental of such a box. You must, of course, afford this matter complete security and access to the box must be limited to those Agents handling or supervising the Solo operation. In addition, you are to inventory the box on a monthly basis and advise the Bureau concerning receipts and disbursements from this box in the monthly Solo funds letter submitted by your office.

1 - M. F. Roy (6221 IB)


WGS:pah

(8)

NOTE:

See memorandum Baumgardner to Sullivan, dated 1/28/66, captioned same, prepared by WGS:pah.

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Wick
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy



FEB 1 11 35 AM '66

65 FEB 15 1966 TELETYPE UNIT

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan *WCS*

DATE: January 28, 1966

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner *FJB*

SUBJECT: SOLO
INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST

- 1 - DeLoach
- 1 - Sullivan
- 1 - M. F. Row
(6221 IB)
- 1 - Baumgardner
- 1 - Shaw

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Wick _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

The New York Office by letter dated 1/25/66 has requested authority to rent a safe-deposit box (rental not to exceed \$100 per year) for the purpose of maintaining Solo funds.

NY 694-S* and CG 5824-S* are the custodians of Solo funds which are funds furnished to the Communist Party, USA, by the Soviets as a financial subsidy. As of 1/1/66, Solo funds in the amount of \$1,003,533.78 were being maintained. Of that amount, \$678,609 is maintained by NY 694-S* in two safe-deposit boxes in New York City, \$215,000 is maintained in a safe-deposit box rented by the New York Office (this box is also used to store valuables in security and criminal matters), and the balance of the Solo funds are maintained in Chicago, Illinois, by CG 5824-S*.

Current practice calls for NY 694-S* to immediately turn over to the New York Office for processing the Solo funds he receives from the Soviets. As soon as the processing is completed the Solo funds are returned to the informant. At the present time, the two safe-deposit boxes maintained by NY 694-S* are filled to capacity and informant expects to receive in excess of a quarter of a million dollars in Solo funds from the Soviets in February, 1966.

New York has pointed out that by renting a safe-deposit box exclusively for the use of Solo funds, sufficient space to keep the Solo funds to be delivered in February, 1966, would be available and it would enable New York to keep its own inventory of the funds rather than having to rely solely on the informant's figures. In addition, NY 694-S* has advised that it would be extremely burdensome on him to have to maintain an additional safe-deposit box.

It is believed that the granting of New York's request would greatly facilitate the handling of Solo funds and at the same time tighten the security of the Solo operation.

100-428091
Enclosure

WGS:pah
(6) *pah*

CONTINUED--OVER

REC-3 100-428091-5344

6 FEB 11 1966

Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan
Re: SOLO
100-428091

RECOMMENDATION:

That the attached letter be sent to New York
authorizing that office to rent a safe-deposit box for
the exclusive use of Solo funds.

WEL met
✓
every day
P
Jo

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : Mr. Conrad *[Signature]*

FROM : C. F. Downing

DATE: February 8, 1966

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Wick _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen *[Signature]*
Sullivan *[Signature]*
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

SUBJECT: SOLO
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

[Handwritten mark] On 2/8/66, the New York Office furnished the text of a message the informant desired to send and requested that it be enciphered. The cipher text was furnished to New York on the same day.

The plain text and cipher text are attached.

ACTION:

For information.

Enclosure

- 1 - Mr. Conrad
- 2 - Mr. Sullivan (Attention: Mr. J. A. Sizoo, Mr. W. G. Shaw)
- 1 - Mr. Downing
- 1 - Mr. Newpher
- 1 - Mr. Paddock

[Handwritten initials] HS:dek *[Handwritten initials]*

REC-3

[Handwritten signature]
100-428091-5345

6 FEB 11 1966

EX-102

65 FEB 15 1966 *[Handwritten initials]*

66925 47826 65001 73520 55333 00345 10734 26015 70928 36242
20610 74968 85246 10606 35263 52603 28704 21329 84961 83314
42033 37231 60384 38401 37608 94026 56616 42182 38802 62573
03328 33285 95256 95811 68337 97172 07734 54394 45582 05533
01441 96605 44462 33655 26245 72078 87935 45507 07998 68397
71201 08835 07318 27101 89844 01810 88936 06903 74637 69569
72587 72380 49188 01118 34554 47434 13705 07197 00679 56303
96192 97828 26471 10955 94269 53956 46748 76570 74884 31198
24669 61148 29379 48763 40028 08627 63914 72715 45855 40561
30154 01171 06492 05947 33168 75379 36696 22849 49396 60786
90079 60408 11043 82100 87432 82168 97763 76441 00945 79564
32767 78653 26108 07573 37366 30176 10418 58834 80414 10881
45703 01183 36747 82073 77193 75159 79613 38953 31457 59356
73515 20388 20471 53503 43416 22853 39627 04024 15517 28703
85968 44818 61535 85059 36330 92646 52922 99378 72211 57846
54084 13466 91023 57111 12777 56253 88099 01733 15277 62592
39798 05207 33125 28711 42701 48985 65132 72418 47757 39483
88044 25630 58685 64169 38678 90739 03038 37341 52022 12486
62142 75788 02454 75082 66504 53625 46952 92787 62815 09126
17219 89961 90097 32299 81566 01157 38197 58498 08051 11276
30198 77368 81736 54375 92741 52064 35936 01231 05535 94581
32431 45449 38984 51775 71063 67169 78600 14468 78883 61425
78254 98147 06968 68009 22998 89318 57545 40115 64183 86487
87045 83314 88060 55218 15133 10222 47991 56153 83985

2/8/66

REFEREE COACH CONFIDENTIAL MOST URGENT PLEASE TRANSMIT TO
REFEREE SAXON LANE WITHOUT DELAY. ROBERT SCHEER ROBERT SC
HEER FOREIGN EDITOR RAMPARTS MAGAZINE, ARDENT ANTICOVE P
LUG, CANDIDATE FOR COVE CONGRESS IN NOVEMBER NATIONAL HOPS
WHO HAS MANY BROAD CONNECTIONS IN IMPORTANT NATIONAL INNER
POLITICAL CIRCLES IN COVE, WILL BE IN CAMBODIA NEXT FEW DAYS
AND WILL APPLY AT SAXON CASHIER IN CAMBODIA FOR PERMISSION TO
ENTER SAXON. URGENTLY REQUEST THAT HE BE INVITED TO SAXON A
ND BE GRANTED INTERVIEWS AND TALKS IN YOUR AUTHORITATIVE GO
VERNMENT CIRCLES. REASON FOR HIS TRAVELING NOW IN SOUTHEAS
T ASIA IS TO GATHER FACTS AND MATERIAL FOR CAUSE OF EBB AND INF
IGHT AGAINST COVE PLUG IN HIS PROGRAM IN HIS CAMPAIGN FOR CON
GRESS. IF YOU CANNOT AND DO NOT GRANT HIM ENTRY INTO SAXON THE
SUGGEST AN INTERVIEW AT THE CASHIER. HE INTENDS TO SPREAD
OUR CAUSE FOR EBB AND AGAINST COVE PLUG ON NATION-WIDE SCALE
AND IN CONGRESS WHEN ELECTED. BIRCH REFEREE BOXER.

RECEIVED

100-428091-5343

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: February 7, 1966

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner

1 - DeLoach
1 - Sullivan
1 - Baumgardner
1 - R. C. Putnam

SUBJECT: SOLO
INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Wick _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

My memorandum of 1/10/66 set forth in detail receipts and disbursements of funds from the Soviet Union and Red China by the Communist Party, USA, during the month of December, 1965. The following schedule shows the present status of these funds together with disbursements during January, 1966.

SUMMARY:

Total received from the Soviet Union 9/58 to 1/31/66.....	\$3,443,639.00
Total received from Red China 2/60 to 1/31/66.....	50,000.00
Grand total received 9/58 to 1/31/66.....	3,493,639.00
Total disbursements to 1/31/66.....	2,396,107.12
Balance of Fund 1/31/66.....	\$1,097,531.88

This balance is maintained as follows:

\$931,733.78 by NY 694-S* in New York City.
165,798.10 by CG 5824-S* in Chicago.

DETAILS:

Total received from Soviet Union 9/58 to 12/31/65.....	\$3,443,639.00
Total received from Red China 2/60 to 12/31/65.....	50,000.00
Grand total received 9/58 to 12/31/65.....	3,493,639.00
Total disbursements to 12/31/65.....	2,331,561.51
Balance of Fund 12/31/65.....	1,162,077.49

DISBURSEMENTS DURING JANUARY, 1966:

1/4 & 8/66 - Cash to Gus Hall, General Secretary of Communist Party, USA (\$1,300). Gifts for Hall's family at his instruction (\$226.22). Shoes for Hall (\$42.83).....\$ 1,569.05

1/8/66 - Gifts for contacts abroad (\$60) and books sent abroad (\$60)..... 120.00

100-428091

CONTINUED--OVER

RCP:pah
(5)

65 FEB 17 1966

EX-112 REC-9

6 FEB 15 1966

100-428091-5346

Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan
Re: SOLO
100-428091

1/9/66 - Gifts for Party functionaries in New York.....\$	41.56
1/11, 15/66 - Salary and expenses of Max Weinstein who is engaged in locating suitable investments for Party funds.....	1,000.00
1/18/66 - For eight weeks' operating expenses of "The Worker," Party newspaper.....	24,000.00
For operating expenses of "Freedomways," Party Negro publication.....	5,000.00
For operating expenses of the Party's National Office.....	11,000.00
Cash to Gus Hall.....	800.00
1/26/66 - To Gus Hall for "People's World," west coast communist newspaper, and to operate Party's west coast offices.....	10,000.00
To Lem Harris to invest in real estate for the Party.....	10,000.00
To Isidore Needleman to invest in stock market for the Party.....	1,000.00
1/27/66 - Baby gift sent daughter of leader of Communist Party of Canada.....	15.00
TOTAL DISBURSEMENTS FOR JANUARY, 1966.....\$	64,545.61
BALANCE OF FUND -- JANUARY 31, 1966.....	\$1,097,531.88

ACTION:

None. This memorandum is submitted for your information. An up-to-date accounting of Solo funds will be brought to your attention each month. Details of the accounting of these funds are not to be disseminated.

~~TOP SECRET~~

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

(IS) 100-428091

BY LIAISON

Date: February 15, 1966

1 - Branigan
1 - Liaison
1 - Shaw

To: Director
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Department of State

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director

Subject: FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - RUSSIA
INTERNAL SECURITY - RUSSIA

2-16-66 delivered asth
Solo

The following information was supplied by a source which has furnished reliable information in the past.

Nikolai Vladimirovich Mostovets, head of the North and South American Sections of the International Department, Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union, is scheduled to head up a new section of the International Department which will deal exclusively with Latin-American affairs.

Igor Mikhailov and Andre Urnov, both of whom work in the International Department on affairs pertaining to the United States, are scheduled to visit the United States in the near future in order to intimately study conditions in the United States. They plan to spend approximately three months in the United States and will also familiarize themselves with the operations of the Communist Party, USA. In connection with his forthcoming visit to the United States, Urnov has expressed some concern over the fact that in a recent article Ben Levine, a writer for "The Worker," east coast communist newspaper, mentioned Urnov and gave a very accurate description of him.

pen
Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Wick _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

WGS:pah
(7) *pah*

REC-22

100-428091-534
FEB 16 1966

(SEE NOTE PAGE TWO)

~~TOP SECRET~~
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

65 FEB 17 1966

TELETYPE UNIT ☐


~~TOP SECRET~~

Director
Bureau of Intelligence and Research

Because of the sensitive nature of the source which furnished the above information, this letter is classified "~~Top Secret~~."

1 - Director BY LIAISON
Central Intelligence Agency

Attention: Deputy Director, Plans

delivered to 
CIA
2/16/66
WOG

NOTE:

Classified "~~Top Secret~~" since the disclosure of data furnished by source (NY 694-S*) could reasonably result in the identification of source, who is of continuing value and such revelation could result in exceptionally grave damage to the Nation. See NYairtel 2/8/66 captioned "Solo, IS - C," which discloses that NY 694-S* obtained this information from Peggy Dennis, wife of the late Eugene Dennis, former Chairman, CPUSA. Peggy Dennis had just returned from the Soviet Union where she had conferred with Nikolai V. Mostovets.

~~TOP SECRET~~

F B I

Date: 2/10/66

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via AIRTEL REGISTERED
(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)
 FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637)
 SUBJECT: SOLO
 IS-C

On 2/9/66, NY 694-S*, pursuant to arrangements previously made by the Soviets, delivered a roll of microfilm to a drop, the microfilm containing the following messages, two of which were in cipher code and the rest in partial code:

(1) The following message was in cipher code:

"CCCPSU ~~Confidential~~ Most Urgent

"Please transmit to CC North Vietnam CP without delay.

"ROBERT SCHEER, foreign editor, Ramparts Magazine, ardent anti U. S. imperialism, candidate for United States Congress in November national elections, who has many broad connections in important national inner political circles in U. S., will be in Cambodia next few days and will apply at North Vietnam Embassy in Cambodia for permission to enter North Vietnam. Urgently request that he be invited to North Vietnam and be granted interviews and talks in your authoritative government circles. Reason for his travelling now in Southeast Asia is to gather facts and material for

- 3 - Bureau (RM)
 1 - Chicago (134-46-Sub B) (AM RM)
 1 - NY 134-91 (INV) (41)
 1 - NY 105-14931-Sub C (TALANOV) (341)
 1 - NY 100-134637 (41)

ACB:msb
 (8)

REC-19 100-428091-534 8

EX-102

6 FEB 16 1966

Approved: [Signature]
 Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

65 FEB 18 1966

NY 100-134637

"cause of peace and in fight against U. S. imperialism in his program in his campaign for Congress. If you cannot and do not grant him entry into North Vietnam, then suggest an interview at the Embassy. He intends to spread your cause for peace and against U. S. imperialism on nationwide scale and in Congress when elected.

"GUS HALL
CCCPUSA"

Re above, see NY teletype, 2/8/66.

(2) The following message was in cipher code:

"Will you designate places where money is to be picked up or shall I?"

"JACK BROOKS"

(3) The following message was in partial code:

"CCCPUSU

"This will notify you that CARL WINTER has been appointed editor of our 'Worker,' replacing JAMES JACKSON who is now on official leave.

"GUS HALL"

(4) The following message was in partial code:

"The question of the biography of CPUSA leaders and the film strips and photos are in the hands of HYMAN LUMER and he is handling this question. It will be discussed with you more concretely in the coming weeks. These questions were raised by LEONID CHERNOV with person identical with CG 5824-S*.

"Person identical with CG 5824-S*"

The NYO is not familiar with the significance of the above message, which was prepared by CG 5824-S*. Unless previously done so, the Chicago Office should explain this message for the information of the Bureau.

NY 100-134637

(5) The following message was in partial code:

"ISIDORE NEEDLEMAN provided the information on the Negro delegation. Please inform us what you mean by Negro delegation. Does this refer to arrangements made with CLAUDE LIGHTFOOT on the Negro artists delegation? We need a reply immediately since if it is the artists delegation, they are being booked for exhibits in various other countries on set dates.

"Please reply without delay."

The NYO is not familiar with the significance of the above message, which was prepared by CG 5824-S*. Unless previously done so, the Chicago Office should explain this message for the information of the Bureau.

(6) The following message was in partial code:

"I am of the opinion that so far we have no agreement on places for personal contact for the future.

"JACK BROOKS"

(7) The following message was in partial code:

"Drop EVA is next."

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

FBI

Date: 1/31/66

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via AIRTEL REGISTERED MAIL
(Priority)TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)
Attn: FBI Laboratory

FROM: SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SOLO
IS-C*Mr. [unclear]
Special*

ReNYairtel dated 1/24/66 to which were attached for the Bureau and Chicago two documents dated 10/18/65 and 11/5/65 addressed to the Central Committee, CP of the Soviet Union, from the Central Committee, CP of China, which documents were received at a New York mail drop from the CP of Canada.

Attached to each of these two English language documents is a Russian language text. A close examination of the Russian language texts reveals that these two documents are, in fact, letters dated 9/18/65 and 10/21/65 from the Central Committee, CP of the Soviet Union, to the Central Committee, CP of China. It will be noted that each is the companion to one of the English language documents since it is the Russian letter to which the Chinese are replying in each instance.

The FBI Laboratory is requested to expeditiously prepare full translations of these two Russian language documents, copies of which are enclosed herewith. The FBI Laboratory is requested to prepare these translations in form suitable to be turned over to CG 5824-S* and NY 694-S* who, in turn, if deemed desirable, may turn them over to GUS HALL, General Secretary, CP, USA. Therefore, no markings

1-904

4-Bureau (RM)

(1 - FBI Laboratory, Cryptanalysis-Translation Section) (Enc. 2)

1-New York (100-134637) (Info) (RM)

1-Chicago

WAB:MDW

(6)

ENCLOSURE

102

FEB 16 1966

W. G. Shaw

Approved: *[Signature]*
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

DOWDING

66 FEB 10 1966

*Airtel to CG + NY Encls 3
WGS:PAH
2/9/66*

CG 134-46 Sub B

should appear on these translations indicating that they were prepared by the FBI nor should typical Bureau form be used such as typing proper names in all capital letters. Furthermore, the original should be typed on unwatered thin or onionskin paper and the original and two carbon copies should be furnished to the New York Office and two carbon copies to the Chicago Office since NY 694-S* will probably be the informant to give them to GUS HALL. Handling in the above manner will obviate the necessity of retyping the translations in the field.

The enclosures need not be returned as additional copies are included in the files of this office.

TRANSLATION FROM RUSSIAN

(1) Copy of a 6-page typewritten letter

* * *

TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA

Dear comrades,

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has decided to appeal to you in connection with the tense situation which has developed as a result of the armed conflict between India and Pakistan. According to the information we have, the scale of the armed clash between India and Pakistan continues to expand. Both sides have placed into action considerable contingents of troops and military equipment, including tanks and aviation and naval forces. The armed conflict between Pakistan and India threatens to expand into a big war.

This conflict runs counter to the national interests of the peoples of these very countries. It undermines their economy; leads to the lowering of the living standard of the working people; and increases the dependence of these countries upon the imperialists. In both countries, the wave of chauvinistic and militaristic feeling is growing; the attention of the working class and of the broad popular masses of India and Pakistan is diverted away from the struggle for the solution of vital social problems. In the environment of an emergency war situation, reactionaries of these countries get broader opportunities for attacking the democratic rights of the people and for expansion of repressions against the revolutionary forces.

The outbreak and expansion of a new military conflict in Asia places a strain upon the already tense international situation and creates a serious threat to universal peace. If we look at this conflict in a broad perspective, from the point of view of the problems of the struggle against the principal enemy - American imperialism - the armed clash between India and Pakistan, simultaneously with the continuously growing U. S. aggression in Vietnam, concretely

TRANSLATED BY:

February 4, 1966

lsh

b6
b7c

ENCLOSURE

100-428091

100-428091-5349

ORIGINAL sent to NY BY letter 2-10-66
with CC to CG

See NY AT 1/21/66

helps the American Government to divert the attention of nations from the struggle against U. S. aggression; weakens the demonstrations of progressive and peace-loving forces in defense of the Vietnamese people, against the imperialist policy of aggression and war. This enables American imperialism to intensify its military-political pressure upon the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and other peace-loving countries and progress still farther along the road of its plundering "escalation."

An armed conflict between two large Asiatic countries - India and Pakistan - causes enormous political damage to the cause of the unification of the countries of Asia and Africa, for the struggle against imperialism, colonialism and neocolonialism, and deals a blow to the movement for strengthening of Afro-Asian solidarity.

Thus, an armed conflict between India and Pakistan is damaging in all respects to the socialist countries, to the international communist movement, to the national-liberation movement, to the struggle against the imperialist policy of aggression and war.

In this connection, we would like to say to you in all frankness, that we were puzzled by the position of the Government of the Chinese People's Republic, which fully and unconditionally supported one of the sides. Is it not clear that such a position, regardless of the motives which dictated it, concretely contributes to the inflaming of the conflict and arouses dismay among the supporters of peace and fighters for national liberation?

One fact is completely clear, regardless of the causes of the origin of the armed clash between India and Pakistan: only forces of imperialism and reaction, only those who would like to put the colonial yoke again upon the peoples of the countries of Asia and Africa, profit from the further expansion of this conflict. We get the impression that the aggravation of relations between India and Pakistan as well as the military clash between them, results from the provocation by imperialist powers, who act according to the method of "divide and rule." This far-reaching provocation is aimed at the undermining of the international anti-imperialist front.

That is why the peoples of the socialist countries and the revolutionary and liberation movement as a whole are interested in the earliest possible liquidation of the conflict between India and Pakistan.

We realize the complexity of differences on the territorial problem which exist between India and Pakistan. However, we proceed from Leninist injunctions on the necessity for particular caution in approaching the territorial problems. Such problems can and must be settled only on the basis of mutual agreement and, of course, by peaceful means. The duty of the socialist countries is to aid such a solution of problems, for in the opposite case, imperialists will succeed in plunging the independent states into endless internecine wars; in causing quarrels between the Afro-Asian peoples and thus create favorable conditions for the realization of a policy of neocolonialism.

The Government of the Chinese People's Republic repeatedly has professed its adherence to the principles of the Bandung Conference, which appealed for the settlement of "all international controversies by peaceful means, such as negotiation, arbitration or reconciliation, legal adjustment, or any other peaceful means chosen by the parties in accordance with the U. N. Charter."

It was pointed out in the declaration of the Chinese Government: "Controversies between Afro-Asian countries left over by history, can be fully solved, justly and reasonably, on the basis of five principles of peaceful coexistence and ten principles of the Bandung Conference, in the spirit of equality and friendly consultation... We are sure that controversies between Afro-Asian countries will be settled sooner or later by means of peaceful consultation."

We believe that we should be guided precisely by these principles in approaching the conflict between India and Pakistan. In the present situation there is no positive advantage in bringing to the fore the question of the causes of the conflict or in determining who is right and who is wrong; this can be clarified after the flames of war are put down. We are deeply convinced that the duty and task of all the socialist and peace-loving countries at the present moment is to aid by all possible means in the termination of the conflict; to utilize their prestige and influence to convince both parties to the conflict to step on the road of a peaceful solution.

The Central Committee of the CPSU noted communications in the press to the effect that on September 17, 1965, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Chinese People's Republic handed a note to the Embassy of India in Peking, containing a demand that the Indian side dismantle within three days its military installations on the Chinese-Indian border. We have not been informed regarding your intentions in this respect and therefore would prefer not to engage in any evaluation of this step of yours at the present moment. However, the question immediately comes up: would it not provide a pretext for imperialist powers, particularly for the U. S., to enter the road of intervention, to engage in serious war provocations, which would complicate still further the situation in this region, tense as it is already.

The Central Committee of the CPSU believes that the duty of the socialist countries is to do everything possible to frustrate the imperialist designs of kindling bloody conflicts between the independent countries of South-east Asia and other regions of the world. Our unanimous position on these problems would be the most sobering deterrent in the way of the warmongers and an effective support for the national liberation movement of the peoples.

We express hope that our Chinese comrades will justly evaluate the efforts of the CPSU and will go along the road of our common struggle against imperialism and colonialism, the struggle for peace and international security.

With communist greetings!

THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE

OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION

September 18, 1965.

(2) Copy of a 4-page typewritten letter

* * *

TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA

Comrades,

You know that the Soviet Union renders military and economic aid to the Vietnamese people in their heroic struggle against American imperialism. You know very well that the Vietnamese people are experiencing enormous difficulties in this struggle and are fighting, sparing no effort. In order to more successfully hold in check the onslaught of the American interventionists, the Vietnamese fighters for freedom and independence of their homeland need modern military equipment. True to its international duty, the Soviet Union does everything in its power to support the Vietnamese people in their sacred struggle. We exert great efforts in order to secure the fulfillment of appeals of our Vietnamese comrades for delivery of military equipment to them.

Unfortunately, from the very outset of our sending of Soviet military shipments to Vietnam, the Chinese authorities have created difficulties in the transporting of Soviet military shipments for the fighting Vietnamese through the territory of the Chinese People's Republic (CPR). After an agreement had been reached between the Soviet Union and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), on the increase and of deliveries of military equipment, representatives of the Chinese administration placed obstacles in the way of our transporting shipments for the DRV. In this connection, we would like to draw your attention to some recent facts.

Inasmuch as the only feasible way of transporting shipments to the DRV passes through the territory of the CPR, our countries, in accordance with the practice established as far back as August 26, 1965, transmitted to the Committee for Foreign Economic Relations of the CPR a proposal to draw appropriate documents for regulating the transport of additional lots of Soviet military freight through the territory of the CPR to the DRV.

Although Soviet representatives informed the Chinese side regarding the fact that these additional deliveries are being made on the urgent appeal of our Vietnamese friends, Chinese authorities have not answered our proposal and when, on October 7, 1965, a representative of the Embassy of the USSR made an inquiry of the Acting Chief of the 1st Directorate of the Committee for Foreign Economic Relations of the CPR, Chiang Chun-he, regarding the expediting of the signing of these letters of exchange, the latter stated that the Chinese side would not accept Soviet military shipments for the DRV until it has been explained "what military technical equipment designated for delivery by the Soviet Union to the DRV in 1965-1967, would be needed by the Vietnamese side first of all; within what time it wishes to receive this equipment and what technical facilities exist for receiving this equipment."

In accordance with this decision, our representatives were told of the refusal to let through the territory of the CPR of a number of transports containing our military aid to Vietnam (this concerns, in particular, transports with 10 military equipment shops, as well as 40 antiaircraft guns, although the transportation of military technical equipment is being carried out in accordance with an agreement already reached earlier between the USSR, CPR and DRV).

Thus, representatives of Chinese authorities, on the one hand, detain the drawing of agreements on conditions for transportation of Soviet military shipments through the CPR, and, on the other hand, refuse to accept these shipments for transport on the pretext that appropriate documents have not yet been signed.

The Central Committee of CPSU is seriously concerned over the existing situation, inasmuch as delay in the deliveries of Soviet military shipments to the DRV creates additional hardships for the heroic Vietnamese people. In a situation where American imperialism has organized a blockade of Vietnam, the territory of the CPR is the connecting link between the DRV and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union and the DRV do not have common borders and the only feasible way, under these circumstances, for delivery of military aid to the fraternal Vietnamese people from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries passes through the territory of the CPR.

The leadership of China cannot help being aware of this circumstance. It has undertaken appropriate obligations at one time. As a matter of fact, in a conversation with comrade Kosygin, comrade Mao Tse-tung promised that the Chinese authorities would help in

every possible way to expedite the delivery of Soviet military equipment to Vietnam. Now, however, contrary to the assurances of comrade Mao Tse-tung, Chinese authorities are obstructing the organization of regular transportation of our shipments to the DRV.

The Central Committee of the CPSU expresses hope that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China will objectively and attentively examine all these facts and adopt immediate measures for insuring the transport through the Chinese territory of Soviet military shipments for the DRV.

With communist greetings,

CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF CPSU

October 21, 1965

ENCLOSURES TO BUREAU, ATTN FBI LAB, FROM
CHICAGO

2 copies of Russian language documents

RE: SOLO
IS-C

Bufile 100-428091
CGfile 134-46 Sub B

Transmitted via CGairtel to Bureau 1/31/66



ENCLOSURE

100-428091-5349

1011

ЦЕНТРАЛЬНОМУ КОМИТЕТУ
КОММУНИСТИЧЕСКОЙ ПАРТИИ КИТАЯ

Товарищи!

Вам известно, что Советский Союз оказывает военно-экономическую помощь вьетнамскому народу в его героической борьбе против американского империализма. Вы хорошо знаете, что вьетнамский народ переживает огромные трудности в этой борьбе, сражается не щадя своих сил. Для того, чтобы успешней сдерживать натиск американских интервентов, вьетнамские борцы за свободу и независимость своей родины нуждаются в современной военной технике. Верный своему интернациональному долгу, Советский Союз делает все для того, чтобы поддерживать вьетнамский народ в его священной борьбе. Мы прилагаем большие усилия для того, чтобы обеспечить выполнение просьб вьетнамских товарищей о поставке им военной техники.

К сожалению, с самого начала перевозок советских военных грузов во Вьетнам китайские власти стали создавать трудности в транспортировке советских военных грузов для сражающегося Вьетнама по территории КНР.

После того, как между Советским Союзом и ДРВ была до-

100-428071-0349

стигнута договоренность об увеличении поставок военной техники и об ускорении ее доставки, представители китайской администрации чинят препятствия в транспортировке наших грузов для ДРВ. В этой связи мы хотели бы обратить ваше внимание на некоторые последние факты.

Поскольку единственно реальный путь транспортировки грузов в ДРВ проходит через территорию КНР, то наши органы в связи с ранее установившейся практикой еще 26 августа с.г. передали в Комитет по внешнеэкономическим связям КНР предложение оформить соответствующими документами порядок перевозок дополнительных партий советских военных грузов через территорию КНР в ДРВ.

Несмотря на то, что советские представители поставили в известность китайскую сторону о том, что эти дополнительные поставки производятся по срочной просьбе вьетнамских друзей, китайские власти долгое время не отвечали на наше предложение, а когда 7 октября с.г. представитель посольства СССР поставил перед зам. начальника I-го управления Комитета по внешнеэкономическим связям КНР Чжан Чунь-хэ вопрос об ускорении подписания этих обменных писем, последний заявил, что китайская сторона не будет принимать советские военные грузы для ДРВ до выяснения "какое военно-техническое имущество, намечаемое к поставке Советским Союзом в ДРВ в

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1965--1967 гг., необходимо Вьетнамской стороне в первую очередь, в какие сроки она желает это имущество получить и какие имеются технические возможности для приема этой техники".

В соответствии с этим решением нашим представителям объявлено об отказе пропускать через территорию КНР ряда транспортов с нашей военной помощью Вьетнаму (это касается, в частности, транспортов с 10 военно-техническими мастерскими, а также 40 зенитными орудиями, хотя перевозка военно-технического имущества осуществляется в соответствии с уже достигнутой ранее договоренностью между СССР, КНР и ДРВ).

Таким образом, представители китайских властей, с одной стороны, задерживают оформление соглашений об условиях перевозок советских военных грузов через КНР, а, с другой стороны, отказываются принимать к перевозке эти грузы под предлогом, что соответствующие документы еще не подписаны.

ЦК КПСС серьезно обеспокоен сложившимся положением, поскольку задержка с доставкой советских военных грузов в ДРВ создает дополнительные трудности для героического вьетнамского народа. В условиях, когда американский империализм организует блокаду Вьетнама, территория КНР является связывающим звеном между ДРВ и Советским Союзом. У Советского Союза и ДРВ нет общих

4.

границ, и единственно реальный в этих условиях путь доставки военной помощи братскому вьетнамскому народу от Советского Союза и других социалистических стран проходит через территорию КНР.

Этого обстоятельства не может не учитывать руководство Китая. В свое время оно приняло на себя соответствующие обязательства. В частности, в беседе с т. Косыгиным т. Мао Цзэ-дун обещал, что китайские власти будут всячески содействовать быстреей доставке советской военной техники во Вьетнам. Сейчас же вопреки заверениям т. Мао Цзэ-дуна китайские власти чинят препятствия в организации бесперебойной транспортировки наших грузов в ДРВ.

Центральный Комитет КПСС выражает надежду, что ЦК КПК объективно и внимательно разберется во всех этих фактах и примет безотлагательные меры к обеспечению транспортировки через китайскую территорию советских военных грузов для ДРВ.

С коммунистическим приветом

Ц К К П С С

21 октября 1965 года

7012

ЦЕНТРАЛЬНОМУ КОМИТЕТУ
КОММУНИСТИЧЕСКОЙ ПАРТИИ КИТАЯ

Дорогие товарищи!

Центральный Комитет Коммунистической партии Советского Союза решил обратиться к вам в связи с напряженной обстановкой, сложившейся в результате вооруженного конфликта между Индией и Пакистаном. По имеющейся у нас информации, масштабы вооруженного столкновения между Индией и Пакистаном все более расширяются. Обе стороны вводят в действие значительные контингенты войск и военной техники, в том числе танки, авиацию, военно-морские силы. Вооруженный конфликт между Пакистаном и Индией грозит перерасти в большую войну.

Это столкновение противоречит национальным интересам народов самих этих стран. Оно подрывает их экономику, ведет к снижению жизненного уровня трудящихся, усиливает зависимость этих государств от империалистов. В обеих странах растет волна шовинистических и милитаристских настроений, внимание рабочего класса и широких народных масс Индии и Пакистана отвлекается от борьбы за решение насущных социальных проблем. В обстановке чрезвычайного военного положения реакция в этих странах получает более широкие возможности для наступления

100-428091-5349

на демократические права народа, расширения репрессий против революционных сил.

Возникновение и расширение нового военного конфликта в Азии накаляет и без того напряженную международную обстановку и создает серьезную угрозу всеобщему миру. Если рассматривать этот конфликт в широком плане, с точки зрения задач борьбы против основного врага -- американского империализма, -- то в обстановке продолжающегося нарастания агрессии США во Вьетнаме вооруженное столкновение между Индией и Пакистаном объективно помогает американскому правительству отвлечь внимание народов от борьбы против агрессии США, ослабляет выступления прогрессивных и миролюбивых сил в защиту вьетнамского народа, против империалистической политики агрессии и войны. Это дает возможность американскому империализму усиливать военно-политический нажим на ДРВ и другие миролюбивые страны, еще дальше продвигаться на пути своей разбойничьей "эскалации".

Вооруженный конфликт между двумя крупными государствами Азии -- Индией и Пакистаном -- причиняет огромный политический ущерб делу объединения стран Азии и Африки для борьбы против империализма, колониализма, и неоколониализма, наносит удар по движению за укрепление афро-азиатской солидарности.

Таким образом, вооруженный конфликт между Индией и Пакистаном во всех отношениях вреден для стран социа-

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листического лагеря, международного коммунистического движения, национально-освободительного движения, для борьбы против империалистической политики агрессии и войны.

В этой связи мы хотели бы сказать вам со всей откровенностью, что у нас вызвала недоумение позиция правительства КНР, которое полностью и безоговорочно поддержало одну из сторон. Разве не ясно, что такая позиция, независимо от того, чем она продиктована, объективно служит разжиганию конфликта, вызывает огорчение у всех сторонников мира и борцов за национальное освобождение.

Независимо от причин возникновения вооруженного столкновения между Индией и Пакистаном, совершенно ясно одно: от дальнейшего расширения этого конфликта выигрывают только силы империализма и реакции, только те, кто снова хотел бы набросить колониальное иго на народы стран Азии и Африки. У нас создается впечатление, что обострение отношений между Индией и Пакистаном, а также военное столкновение между ними являются результатом провокации империалистических сил, действующих методом "разделяй и властвуй". Эта далеко идущая провокация направлена на подрыв международного антиимпериалистического фронта.

Вот почему народы социалистических стран, все революционное и освободительное движение заинтересованы в быстрой ликвидации конфликта между Индией и

Пакистаном.

Мы отдаем себе отчет в сложности тех разногласий, которые существуют между Индией и Пакистаном по территориальному вопросу. Однако мы исходим из ленинских указаний о необходимости особой осторожности в подходе к территориальным проблемам. Такие проблемы могут и должны регулироваться только на основе взаимной договоренности и, конечно, мирными средствами. Долг социалистических государств состоит в том, чтобы способствовать такому решению вопросов, ибо в противном случае империалистам удастся ввергнуть независимые государства в нескончаемые междоусобные войны, перессорить народы Азии и Африки и тем самым создать благоприятные условия для осуществления политики неокOLONиализма.

Правительство КНР не раз заявляло о своей приверженности принципам Бандунгской конференции, которая призвала к урегулированию "всех международных споров мирными средствами, такими, как переговоры, арбитраж или примирение, юридическое урегулирование, так же, как и другими мирными средствами по выбору сторон в соответствии с Уставом ООН".

В заявлении Китайского правительства указывалось: "Оставленные историей споры между азиатско-африканскими странами вполне можно разрешить справедливо и разумно на основе пяти принципов мирного сосуществования и десяти принципов Бандунгской конференции, в духе равноправия и дружественных консультаций... Мы уверены в

том, что споры между азиатско-африканскими странами рано или поздно будут урегулированы разумно, путем мирных консультаций".

Мы считаем, что именно этими принципами и необходимо руководствоваться в подходе к конфликту между Индией и Пакистаном. В сложившейся обстановке нет положительного смысла в том, чтобы выдвигать на первый план вопрос о причинах возникновения конфликта, искать, кто прав, а кто виноват, это можно будет выяснить, когда пламя войны будет погашено. По нашему глубокому убеждению, в настоящий момент долг и задача всех социалистических и миролюбивых государств заключается в том, чтобы всемерно содействовать прекращению конфликта, использовать свой авторитет и влияние с целью убедить обе враждующие стороны встать на путь мирного урегулирования.

ЦК КПСС обратил внимание на сообщения печати о том, что 17 сентября с.г. Министерство иностранных дел КНР вручило посольству Индии в Пекине ноту, в которой выдвигается требование, чтобы индийская сторона в трехдневный срок демонтировала свои военные сооружения в районе китайско-индийской границы. Мы не информированы о ваших намерениях в этой связи и поэтому предпочли бы не делать в данный момент каких-либо оценок этого вашего шага. Но один вопрос возникает уже сейчас -- не даст ли это повод для империалистических держав, в частности для

6.

США, к тому, чтобы встать на путь вмешательства, пойти на серьезные военные провокации, что еще более осложнило бы и без того напряженное положение в этом районе.

ЦК КПСС считает, что долг социалистических стран сделать все от них зависящее для срыва империалистических замыслов разжигания кровавых конфликтов между независимыми странами Юго-Восточной Азии и других районов мира. Наша единая позиция по этим вопросам явилась бы самым отрезвляющим средством на пути планов поджигателей войны, эффективной поддержкой для национально-освободительного движения народов.

Мы выражаем надежду, что китайские товарищи правильно оценят усилия КПСС, пойдут путем нашей общей борьбы против империализма и колониализма, борьбы за мир и международную безопасность.

С коммунистическим приветом!

ЦЕНТРАЛЬНЫЙ КОМИТЕТ
КОММУНИСТИЧЕСКОЙ ПАРТИИ СОВЕТСКОГО СОЮЗА

18 сентября 1965 года.

REC-19

FBI ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Date: 2/8/66

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via AIRTEL REGISTERED
(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)
 FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637)
 SUBJECT: SOLO
 IS-C

On 2/7/66, NY 694-S* advised that, according to PEGGY DENNIS, who recently returned from a trip to Moscow, she conferred while there with NIKOLAI VLADIMIROVICH MOSTOVETS, the Head of the North and South American Sections of the International Department of the CC, CPSU. MOSTOVETS, PEGGY DENNIS reported, told her that IGOR MIKHAILOV, MOSTOVETS' assistant, and one ANDRE URNOV, who works in the International Department on "U. S. affairs," were scheduled to go to the United States in the role of correspondents for a period not less than three months "to intimately study the situation in the USA, and to familiarize themselves in every detail with the CPUSA." MOSTOVETS, also according to PEGGY DENNIS, stated that it would be important that the comrades in the U. S. occasionally be in contact with MIKHAILOV and URNOV.

Also, according to PEGGY DENNIS, MOSTOVETS intimated to her that there will be separate sections of the International Department of the CC, CPSU that will be in-charge of Latin America and North America. MOSTOVETS gave PEGGY DENNIS the impression that he may be in charge of Latin America. - He made no comment concerning who would be in charge of North America.

NY 694-S* stated that PEGGY DENNIS had not indicated that she had been informed by MOSTOVETS

- 3 - Bureau (RM)
 1 - Chicago (134-46-Sub B) (AM RM)
 1 - NY 134-91 (INV) (41)
 1 - NY 100-134637 (41)

ACB:msb
 (7)

REC-19 100-428091-5350

EX-102

6 FEB 16 1966

Approved: _____

Sent _____ M Per _____

65 FEB 10 1966 Special Agent in Charge

NY 100-134637

specifically with respect to when MIKHAILOV and URNOV would go to the U. S.

PEGGY DENNIS, according to NY 694-S*, further advised that ANDRE URNOV, mentioned above, stated that he was very much concerned by reason of the fact that BEN LEVINE, TV writer for "The Worker," in a recent article concerning his trip to the Soviet Union, mentioned URNOV and gave a very accurate description of him. URNOV stated that this could be very damaging in view of the fact that URNOV is scheduled to go to the U. S.

~~TOP SECRET~~

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

1 - DeLoach
1 - Sullivan
1 - Bland
1 - Cotter

February 10, 1966

1 - Liaison
1 - Baumgardner
1 - Shaw

ROBERT SCHEER

The following information was supplied by sources which have furnished reliable information in the past.

The Communist Party, USA, is currently making arrangements with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to permit Robert Scheer to enter North Vietnam in order that he might confer with the leadership of the Communist Party of North Vietnam. Scheer reportedly will arrive in Cambodia on or about February 15, 1966, and will request the North Vietnamese Embassy in Cambodia to grant him permission to enter North Vietnam.

Scheer, who is a member of the editorial staff of "Ramparts," an independent magazine published monthly in Menlo Park, California, plans to gather material in North Vietnam to use in his fight against United States foreign policy. Scheer reportedly will seek election to the United States Congress during the November, 1966, election and desires to make his opposition to United States policy in Vietnam the main issue in his election campaign.

The Communist Party, USA, has urged the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to prevail upon the Central Committee of the North Vietnamese Communist Party to permit Robert Scheer to enter North Vietnam. In this connection the Communist Party, USA, noted that in the event Scheer is elected to the United States Congress in November, 1966, Scheer will support the Soviets' cause for peace and attack "United States imperialist tactics" on a nationwide scale.

Robert Scheer, who resides in San Francisco, California, has been active in numerous protest demonstrations in the San Francisco area protesting United States policies in Cuba and Vietnam.

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Wick
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

REC-80

100-428091-5351

WGS:pah
(13)

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

(SEE NOTE PAGE TWO)

FEB 17 1966

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

REC'D-READING ROOM

FEB 10 2 31-PM '66

SENT PER NOTATION
ON MEMORANDUM

6/3

FEB 10 3 50 PM '66
WGS I
FEB 10 1966

~~TOP SECRET~~

NOTE:

Classified "~~Top Secret~~" since unauthorized disclosure of this information could reveal the identity of the source (NY 694-S*) who is of continuing value and such revelation could result in exceptionally grave damage to the Nation. Dissemination is being made to Honorable Marvin Watson, Special Assistant to the President; Honorable Dean Rusk, Secretary of State; Vice Admiral William F. Raborn, Jr., Director, Central Intelligence Agency; and the Attorney General by routing slips. Data extracted from NYtel 2/8/66, captioned "Solo, Internal Security - Communist." See memorandum Bauggardner to Sullivan, dated 2/9/66, captioned "Solo, Internal Security - Communist," prepared by WGS:pah.

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: February 9, 1966

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner

SUBJECT: SOLO
INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST

1 - DeLoach
1 - Sullivan
1 - Bland
1 - Cotter
1 - Liaison
1 - Baumgardner
1 - Shaw

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

On 2/8/66 NY 694-S* advised that upon the instructions of Gus Hall, General Secretary, Communist Party, USA, informant was transmitting a message to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union via the clandestine Solo communication apparatus. The message related to the following matter:

The Communist Party, USA, urged the Soviets to prevail upon the North Vietnamese Communist Party leadership to permit Robert Scheer to enter North Vietnam. Scheer planned to be in Cambodia about 2/15/66 and would apply at the North Vietnamese Embassy in Cambodia for permission to enter North Vietnam. Scheer plans to gather material in North Vietnam to use in his fight against United States foreign policy. Scheer reportedly will seek election to United States Congress in 11/66 and desires to make his opposition to United States policy in Vietnam the main issue of his election campaign. The Communist Party, USA, noted that if Scheer is elected to Congress he will support the Soviets; cause for peace and will attack "United States imperialist tactics" on a nationwide scale.

Bureau files disclose that Robert Scheer resides in San Francisco and is on the editorial staff of "Ramparts," an independent magazine published monthly in Menlo Park, California. Scheer has been active in numerous protest demonstrations in the San Francisco area protesting United States policies in Cuba and Vietnam. Scheer is the subject of security investigation by the San Francisco Division.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the attached summary of the above information be sent to the Honorable Marvin Watson, Special Assistant to the President; Honorable Dean Rusk, Secretary of State; Vice Admiral William F. Raborn, Jr., Director, Central Intelligence Agency; and the Attorney General by routing slips.

100-428091
Enclosures

WGS:pah
(8)

EX-112

FEB 16 1966

F B I

Date: 2/2/66

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via AIRTEL REGISTERED
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS - C

Re New York airtels, 1/21/66 and 1/24/66,
reflecting that the Soviets intended to forward to
the CPUSA a document concerning USSR - China relations.

On 2/2/66, there was received at the Catherine
Drop, a microfilm roll containing what is believed to
be the message above referred to. Copies of the prints of
aforesaid document are enclosed herewith for the Bureau
and Chicago.

NY 694-S* requests that the Chicago Office
furnish CG 5824-S* with a copy of this document.

*No
Dissemination
Approved 12
1/25/66
of 2/14/66
off*

3-Bureau (Encl. 1) (RM)
1-Chicago (134-46 Sub B) (Encls. 2) (RM)
1-New York (134-91) (Inv) (41)
1-New York (105-14931 Sub C) (NIKOLAI M. TALANOV) (341)
1-New York

ACB: tmm
(8)

*See also
65-52604-226
Furnished by H-5
To CIA
C G. Wick*

27 ENCLOSURE

REC-80 100-428091-5352

2 FEB 8 1966

Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

65 FEB 17 1966

INT. SEC.

100-428091-5352

BEST COPY

"The CC CPSU AVAILABLE. It necessary to inform You confidentially about our attitude to latest actions of the CPSU leaders. The most essential of those actions at our opinion were the articles published on November 11 and December 30, 1955, in the newspaper "People's Daily" and in the magazine "Red Flag".

We consider it the more so expedient as the CPSU does not conduct open polemics against Chinese leaders' statements; does not reply through the press to their attack and expresses its views only in positive aspects.

As You know, in the above article on last November 11, the CPSU leadership declared their refusal from common actions with other socialist countries and communist parties in the struggle against imperialism and first of all in the cause of defending fraternal Vietnam against the US piratical aggression.

In that article a thesis was put forward that now "there is everything to dispute and nothing to unite them, that which never can oppose each other and nothing is in common".

On December 30, the paper "People's Daily" published another ar-2
ticle in which the CPC leadership in a categorical form reaffirmed the
above line by declaring that they would strive so farth for "political
and organizational separation" with the leadership of those parties, who
does not share their views.

2 The policy of the CPC leadership touches vital interests of all
anti-imperialist forces, all fraternal parties as vanguard of the united
communist movement.

After the October Plenum (1964) the CC CPSU made all its best to
normalize relations with the CPC, to ensure unity of actions in the
struggle against common imperialist enemy. And that was done despite
the existing differences. While doing so we had in mind the fact that
the interests of the whole socialist camp, the whole communist movement

are suffering because of continuity of differences.

3 In an effort to create favorable political atmosphere, the CC CPSU unilaterally stopped open polemics. In Moscow and Peking there were negotiations with the representatives of the CPC leadership. We went to these negotiations with full sincerity, striving from the very beginning to conduct it on the business-like basis and in the spirit that could enable to achieve concrete positive results.

We stepped out with a wide programme of normalization of sino-soviet relations both in party and state aspects. This programme included proposals about bilateral meeting of the CPSU and the CPC delegations at the highest level, about reciprocal refusal from polemics. It included also concrete proposals on increasing sino-soviet trade, scientific, technical and cultural cooperation, on coordination of foreign policy activities of the CPC and the USSR.

But our efforts encountered strong opposition from the Chinese

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leaders. The CC CPC fully ignored the proposal about bilateral meeting at the highest level. The CPC leadership did not agree on increasing of economic, technical and cultural cooperation and even undertook new steps towards its curtailment.

It showed that the CPC leadership took the line towards further worsening of sino-soviet relations.

The Chinese leaders declare more often that the CPC conducts a political war against the Soviet Union.

Against common sense they introduce it as the struggle of "the state of the proletariat against the state of the bourgeoisie". The Chinese people is indoctrinated that the Soviet Union is one of its main enemies. At different organizations and factories of China meetings take place and every participant of these meetings is obliged to speak and to criticize the Soviet Union. Organization of anti-soviet meetings became a system.

The Peking propaganda spreads inventions that the CPSU "creates and develops new system of exploitation, propagates and brings up new bourgeoisies, accelerates the tempo of restoration of capitalism". In this absurd propaganda of the Chinese leaders we see not only malicious slander about the CPSU and the Soviet people, but the activities detrimental to the world communist movement as a whole as well, because to try to deny the victory of Socialism in the USSR and its further development towards Communism - is to waste other peoples' time, to sow pessimism and defeatism in the revolutionary movement.

For some time past the CPR leaders insistently propagandize the thesis about possibility of military conflicts between China and the Soviet Union. On November 29, 1965, Chen Yi, the CC CPC Politbureau member, deputy premier and foreign minister of the CPR, at a

press conference in Beijing blatantly spoke about possibility of coordination of actions of the USSR to the North of China with an aggressive war of the USA against the GPR.

The Chinese side provoked conflicts on the sino-soviet border. At the same time the Chinese government refuses to renew the negotiations on defining the border line, which were broken in May, 1964. It clearly prefers to leave this question unresolved.

Meantime there are spread absolutely unreasonable statements that the USSR unlawfully possesses the Chinese territory in the Far East.

The present sino-soviet border has a sound base, it was defined by the treaties signed by the Governments of both states.

Great damage to the common cause of socialist countries, to the world liberation movement is being done now by the position of the CPC leadership on the struggle of the DRV, of the whole Vietnamese people against the US aggression.

The CPSU starts from the fact that the aid to the socialist country - DRV - which is under aggression, is a sacred internationalist duty of all anti-imperialist forces and first of all that of the socialist states. The USSR supplies the DRV with a lot of armaments, missile sites, anti-aircraft artillery, planes, tanks, coast defence artillery, ships and other arms. Our military aid is given in quantities set up by the Vietnamese leadership itself. The Vietnamese leaders underlined more than once the great importance of the Soviet military aid and moral support of

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the DRV. For instance, Pham Van Dong, head of the DRV govern-
ment, declared: "The USSR gives us the best technical equipment,
but we do not use it properly yet.... Even the technical equip-
ment that we do use now helps us greatly.... We highly praise
your aid, we are very pleased with it and we say about it to all,
and we will defeat the Americans with Soviet arms".

We have no doubts that American imperialists dared to un-
leash aggression in Vietnam relying on further deepening of dif-
ferences in the communist movement and in particular on sharpen-
ing of Sino-Soviet relations that takes place through the CPC
leadership's fault.

9

In our opinion, it goes without saying that the aid to Vietnam would have been much more effective if all socialist countries and especially the DRV, the USSR and the CPR, coordinated their actions.

The CPSU proposed more than once to the Chinese leadership to undertake common actions in support of Vietnam. We would consider it useful, for instance, to have common statement of all socialist countries in support of the Vietnamese people. But the Chinese leadership came out against such an action of socialist states. In view of the American aggression against the DRV becoming wider our Party proposed twice to convene a meeting of the three parties representatives - the PwV, the CPSU and the CPC - at the highest level to achieve an agreement on coordinated actions.

in rendering help to the DRV. But again, those proposals favoured by the CC PNV's Politbureau were declined by the Chinese leaders.

At the same time the CPC leadership put obstacles to realization of the agreement between the Governments of the USSR and the DRV on urgent increase of military aid to the DRV. The CPC leadership didn't permit the flights of the soviet transport planes with military cargo over the GPR territory. Since then the Chinese officials put obstacles in transportation of military goods to Vietnam by railroad as well.

Declaring openly of its unwillingness to undertake common actions with the USSR and other socialist countries, making public

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its difference with the USSR, putting obstacles in rendering socialist aid to the DRV, the Chinese leaders in fact encourage Soviet-American aggressors in their military actions against Vietnam.

It is characteristic, for instance, that the CPC leadership propagandized the inevitability of protracted war in Vietnam for many years ahead.

"If present generation do not achieve the aim, -- declares Chen Yi, the CPC foreign minister, speaking "on behalf" of the Vietnamese people, -- let the future generation continue the fight".

It is evident that the Chinese leaders need the continuation of the war to preserve the atmosphere of international tension to depict China as a "besieged fortress". There are all grounds to say that one of the Chinese leaders' aims in the Vietnamese question is to provoke military conflict between the USSR and the USA.

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AVAILABLE. The CPC leadership's position becomes more and more detrimental to the interests of National Liberation movement. This is confirmed, for instance, by their attitude towards the Conference of Afro-Asian countries (the Second Bandung). The Chinese leadership turned out its preparation for the Second Bandung into a highly anti-Soviet campaign, trying at any costs and despite the opinion of revolutionary and progressive forces in Asian and African countries, not to let the USSR be present at the Conference.

And when it became clear that the plans of the CPC leadership encountered the resolute opposition of Afro-Asian states and were doomed to failure, the CPC Government burst out with rude

attacks on the majority of Afro-Asian states and made its best to torpedo the Conference in Algiers.

And what was the position of the CPS in the conflict between India and Pakistan? This conflict plunged into bloodshed two neighbouring peoples, led to reciprocal weakening of India and Pakistan, to dangerous aggravation of the whole situation in South-East Asia. It opened certain possibilities for increasing the influence of imperialism and of internal reactionary in both countries. This conflict was used by American aggressors to divert attention from their activities in Vietnam. It is quite clear that in the interests of anti-imperialist movement, all possible steps should be undertaken to stop military actions and to solve peacefully the conflict which was to the advantage of imperialists. Taking it into consideration the CC CPSU called the CC CPG to take united position in the India-Pakistan conflict.

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The Chinese leaders declared in reply that "It can never happen", and the Chinese propaganda accused the Soviet Union of "collusion with Indian reactionary and American imperialism".

The activities of the CPC leaders led to dissipation or distrust in the CPC even in those countries that were considered not long

ago as its friends. It especially became clear on the African continent and in some Asian countries. In an attempt to divert at-

tention of public opinion from its failures and misadventures

the Chinese leaders continue their line to discredit the position

of the USSR and other socialist countries in the eyes of peoples of newly independent countries, to discredit great assistance of socialist countries to National Liberation movement.

In the Chinese press there is no more definitions that the world is divided into two different social systems - socialism and capitalism. The article published on November 11 admits cooperation of "representatives of upper strata in many nationalist countries" with a part of "monopolist bourgeoisie" of imperialist countries, but it categorically denies the possibility of common actions with the USSR.

Such a position of the Chinese leaders encourages right extremists in the imperialist camp, unties the hands of militarists.

As you know the CPC leaders more and more abandon the principles of proletarian internationalism, communist party-membership and solidarity worded in the Declaration and the Statement. It found the most full expression in their call for a "political and organizational separation" with other communist parties, i.e., practically to split the communist movement.

The Chinese leaders interfere into the internal affairs of other communist parties, support fractional groups created in approximately 30 countries and render them help in different forms. They consider the split of the fraternal parties as "quite natural" and declared even to the whole world that they supported not enough the fractional groups and that is why they intended "to strengthen work in this direction". It is significant that anti-party groups are widely used by imperialist reactionary. The bourgeois press makes them publicity. In a number of countries the authorities offer fractionists an opportunity to use radio and TV, i.e., let the propaganda materials pass without obstacles, and often even assist to spread them.

These are difficulties connected with the activities of the Chinese 17
representatives in the work of democratic international organizations: peace
movement, organization of afro-Asian solidarity, labour, youth, women's and
other international unions and movements. At the beginning of disagreements
when the judgements about position of the Chinese leadership could be made
mostly according to their propaganda, there could be an impression that in
case of the CPC leaders we had to do with theoretically mistaken people who
without understanding the real situation in the world were trying "to expedite
the world revolution" and were ready for the sake of it even to "the total war",
sacrificing their own and foreign peoples. But now there had been filed up a large
number of facts which disclose the true sense and purposes of their conceptions.

18

The sense of their ideas on the questions of war, peace and revolution became absolutely clear. We face here deliberate substitution of the course towards the socialist revolution, made by the working class, uniting around itself masses, by the course towards "world armed revolution", or in other words, by the course towards world war. These views recently were most fully set forth in an article by Lin Biao, vice chairman of the CC CPC, under the title "Long Live the Victory of the People's War", published last september. Referring to Mao Tse Tung, Lin Biao affirms that the world revolution is nothing else but "people's war" of the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America ("World village") against the countries of North America and Western Europe ("World city").

"In a sense, the present situation in the world can be characterised as situation of encirclement of the city by the village of Asia" - is stressed in the article by Lin Biao. The conception of the revolution as the struggle of world village against world city amounts to denial of the internal role of the working class, means a full revision of marxist-leninist teachings of world-wide historic mission of the proletariat.

The CPC leaders are trying to impose on the communist movement the course towards the immediate revolution in all countries irrespective of concrete conditions. They insistently repeat that "good revolutionary situation is now created in the whole world", that "almost 90 percent of the world population is long ago ready to the revolution". If it were so, it wouldn't be difficult to accomplish the world revolution. The facts prove that it is not so.

But the chinese leaders refuse to face the facts, the real conditions in other countries, and even in this case they ignore the opinion of fraternal communist parties.

43

The CPC leaders' desire to force all the communist parties of non-socialist countries to accept the line towards an immediate revolution, regardless the real conditions, means in fact an attempt to impose on the communist movement the tactics of putschism and conspiracy. But such tactics, as it is shown by the facts, gives imperialist bourgeoisie an opportunity to make blood-lettings to revolutionary workers and communist movement, to crush the leadership and activists of some Communist Parties.

The CPC leadership completely ignore a great number of various conditions in countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. To all the peoples of these countries they make an appeal to armed revolt. As before, the Chinese leaders ignore the fact that in some former colonies and semi-colonies the governments are headed by patriotic and revolutionary democratic forces. It is quite natural that appeals to armed uprising against such governments evoke protests of democratic forces.

The Chinese leaders with an increasing insistency pursue allegedly the idea that international tension is advantageous to the revolutionary forces and creates favorable prerequisites for their struggle. They step out with the statements which hardly be estimated otherwise that as provocative. For instance, Chen Yi, stated in one of his latest conversations: "if American imperialists decided to unleash an aggressive war against us, then we welcome that they will come sooner, we welcome that coming tomorrow." Also typical is another statement of Chen Yi, that "with a help of A-bomb it is possible to destroy one or two generations. But the third generation will rise to resist and the world will be reestablished."

Such scornful attitude to lives of millions of people, to the fortunes of the whole nations can only compromise ideology and goals of communists.

22

Our party as it is well known to everybody pursued and continues to pursue a resolute struggle against imperialism. Our people who not only once took up arms to defend the achievements of the Revolution, is not afraid of imperialists' threats. But we step out positively against adventurism, against preparation and urging on the peoples to world nuclear war. Our Party stands for taking common efforts to isolate on the world arena the aggressive circles of imperialism, to set up all peace-loving peoples against them in order, as it was stressed in the Statement of Moscow Meeting of 1960, to restrain by active actions the maniacs of atomic war. The more successful this task is being solved, the more favorable conditions will be created for further advancement of the course of revolutionary remaking of the world, for the final victory of the forces of socialism, national independence and democracy.

In these conditions the CC CPSU considers it to be its duty to retain its principle line towards the normalization of relations with the CPC and CPA.

refraining from actions which could damage the cause of unity of the world communist movement, but at the same time to take measures against splitting course of the CPC's leadership and its attempts to pervert the important tenets of the Marx-Lenin teaching.

We believe that such our line -- continuous safeguarding and development of historic victories of socialism in the U.S.S.R. and other countries of socialist commonwealth, defence of the Marxist-Leninist course, general line of the communist movement, expressed in the Declaration and the Statement, strengthening of international solidarity of Marxist-Leninist Parties-meets the interests of the common cause of the communist movement.

We proceeded and continue to proceed from the assumption that the main enemy of the socialist countries, of the whole communist and liberation

movement used to be and is now imperialism and first of all American imperialism during the period when the world liberation movement encounters activation of imperialist and reactionary forces, when U.S. aggression in Vietnam is escalating, German militarism is living up in FRG, international tension is increasing, we consider it necessary to pursue consistently the course towards the unity of actions of Marxist-Leninist Parties, all anti-imperialist forces,

The CC CPSU considers that at present situation the most significant task is to ensure more coordinated actions of fraternal parties in the struggle for unity of international communist movement. We attach great importance to the development of regional meetings, multilateral and bilateral meetings of the representatives of Communist Parties, to coordination of propaganda efforts, to full scale usage of all other forms of joint actions.

25 Such meetings and exchange of opinions of fraternal parties' representatives provide for creation of conditions for convening in future an international meeting of representatives of fraternal parties. The CC CPSU will continue in future to undertake efforts for normalization of relations with the CPR, for strengthening friendly relations with the chinese people.

At the same time the CC CPSU will repulse non-friendly actions of the CPC leaders against our Party and our people, will repulse the attempts to interfere into internal affairs of the CPSU, to break the unity of the Socialist Commonwealth and international communist movement.

In connection with the chinese article, published November II, we sent to the CC CPC a letter in which stressed the responsibility of the Chinese leaders for their splitting course before their Party, before the chinese people,

before the international communist and liberation movements.

A number of editorials was published in our party press, in which in a positive form were stated the views of the CPSU on the questions raised by the Chinese leaders. Such articles without open polemics will be published in our press in future. As we stated more than ^{once} in talks with the delegations of fraternal Parties, to pursue or not to pursue open polemics is an affair of each Party.

Our Party feels that its her duty to continue in future to achieve consistently new success in construction of Communism on the basis of the line worked out by XI - XXII Congresses of the Party, Programme of the CPSU, decisions of the Plenary Sessions of the CC CPSU taken place in October and November, 1964, in March and September, 1965.

27

The CPSU will tirelessly strengthen political, economic and military might of the USSR, contribute more and more in reinforcing the positions of socialism, of all the revolutionary forces on the world arena.

Foreign policy line of our Party will be henceforth aimed at securing peaceful conditions for construction of Socialism and Communism, at the consolidation the unity of the socialist countries, their friendship and brotherhood, support of the liberation and revolutionary movements, at the most full development of the solidarity and cooperation with independent countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, at the establishment of principles of peaceful coexistence with capitalist countries, at saving the mankind from the world nuclear war.

END.

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

FBI

Date: JAN 28 1966

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via AIRTEL REGISTERED MAIL
(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

FROM: SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SOLO
IS - C

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are three copies and for the New York Office one copy of an informant's statement entitled, "Information Concerning Travel Abroad by Isadore Needleman and [REDACTED] January 3-23, 1966."

The information set forth in the enclosed informant's statement was orally furnished on 1/25 and 26/66 by CG 5824-S*, who has furnished reliable information in the past, to SAs WALTER A. BOYLE and RICHARD W. HANSEN.

Pertinent information appearing in the enclosed informant's statement of interest to other offices is being disseminated by separate communication.

1 - Bureau (Enc. 3) (RM)
1 - New York (100-134637) (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
2 - Chicago
(1 - A) 134-46 Sub B-90

RWH:MDW
(6)

102 6 FEB 17 1966

Approved: *[Signature]*
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

65 FEB 23 1966

**INFORMATION CONCERNING TRAVEL ABROAD BY
ISADORE NEEDLEMAN AND [REDACTED]
JANUARY 3-23, 1966**

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It will be recalled that Isadore Needleman and [REDACTED] Gus Hall, General Secretary of the Communist Party, USA (CP, USA), who resides in Minnesota, departed the United States on January 3, 1966, for Poland where they were to negotiate for the purchase of a purebred Arabian Polish stallion.

On the evening of January 23, 1966, these individuals returned to the United States following completion of successful negotiations in Warsaw, Poland, and later travels which took them to the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and the German Democratic Republic (GDR).

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In connection with these travels of [REDACTED] and Needleman, Needleman made the following comments:

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On their arrival in Warsaw, no representative of the Polish United Workers Party (PUWP) was on hand to meet them and, accordingly, both of them had to go through all of the normal tourist procedures, including an inventory of all money in their possession. Following their clearance as tourists to Poland, Needleman contacted the Bristol Hotel in Warsaw and secured a room for himself and [REDACTED]. At this same time, he placed a call to Harry Yaris, a former American who now resides in Warsaw. Yaris proceeded to the Bristol Hotel and made contact with them shortly after their arrival.

b6
b7C
After some conversation with Yaris, the latter contacted the Central Committee of the PUWP and from this point on both he and [REDACTED] were treated "royally" and the Poles then footed all the bills. The PUWP people with whom they were in contact stated that they were not at the airport to meet them because they had not been previously informed of their pending arrival and also because it had been previously pointed out to them that in order to avoid any problems, plans for their trip were being handled as if they were coming for normal business negotiations or as tourists.

In regard to the negotiations for the purebred Arabian Polish stallion, these were a total success. No contract was signed nor a bill of sale delivered in Warsaw, but the Poles advised that a bill of sale and contract would

be sent to New York in approximately two weeks and it could be signed at that time. The horse would be delivered at some later date. In response to the question as to how much the horse had cost, Needleman laughed and stated, "You know what it cost." From this response it was obvious that the Poles had not charged for the horse and perhaps had not even assessed Hall the transportation costs to bring the horse to the United States.

Throughout their stay in Poland, Yaris was an immense help. The only other former American with whom they were in contact was Dora Lipschitz who also resides in Warsaw.

In general comments regarding Poland, Needleman did complain "how rotten the Party was in Poland" and that "it did not rule like Parties in other countries." He stated, for example, that the taxi drivers and baggage carriers are gyps in that he had to bargain with them as he would have had to in capitalist countries.

Following the stay in Poland, Needleman and [redacted] went to Moscow, USSR, where they made contact with both Nikolai V. Mostovets, Head of the North and South American Section, International Department, Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), and his assistant, Igor Mikhailov. They were treated extremely well by the CPSU in Moscow, taken to the theatre and provided with a week end trip to Leningrad. On one occasion they were the dinner guests of Mostovets and Mikhailov, the latter described by Needleman as a "cold fish."

While in Moscow, Needleman turned over to Mostovets and Mikhailov the draft of the new CP, USA program and another communication from the CP, USA which he had carried with him for delivery to the CPSU. In regard to the draft of the Party program, Mostovets expressed their thanks and appreciation that it had been sent. Both Mostovets and Mikhailov on several occasions asked about Morris Childs and indicated they were expecting to see him and hoped that he would be one of the delegates from the United States for the CPSU Party Congress. They even indicated they might like to see him sooner if possible.

In Moscow, Needleman and [redacted] were in contact with Herb Aptheker who was at the time returning from his trip to Vietnam. They also met with Art Shields, the Moscow correspondent for "The Worker" as well as with Peggy Dennis of San Francisco who had been visiting a son in Moscow. In regard to Aptheker, Needleman noted that this person had received from the Vietnamese as a gift a hand carved ivory necklace but had been afraid to bring it back personally to the United States. Aptheker left the necklace with Art Shields who, in

turn, gave it to Needleman to bring to the United States which he did. In regard to Peggy Dennis, Needleman stated she told him that she plans to return to the United States at the end of January, 1966, unless she receives some instructions to the contrary.

Following their stay in the Soviet Union, they both proceeded on to Prague, Czechoslovakia, where they were treated well by the Czechs. However, Needleman did complain that the "Czechs were stingy" and, as a result, he had to lay out his own dollars for extra items he wanted to buy. The Czechs did, however, take care of their needs, including lodging, food, entertainment, and the like. While in Prague, he had met with a number of representatives of the International Department, Central Committee, Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCZ) such as Frantisek Kopta, Miroslav Jiraska, and Zlatko Tula, the latter being the one mainly responsible for taking care of their personal needs and desires while in the country.

In Prague, he had also been to the headquarters of the "World Marxist Review," official theoretical organ of the international communist movement, where he delivered a part, a transistor, for a tape recorder that (first name unknown) Sharif, Assistant to the Executive Director, "World Marxist Review," had requested several months ago. During this same visit at the "World Marxist Review" headquarters, Sharif inquired as to the reason why Hy Lumer had not submitted to the magazine an article he had promised earlier for publication. Sharif remarked that they were waiting for this article and would like to know what happened.

Before leaving Prague, Needleman visited briefly with John Vafiades, a former American who is now residing in that city.

From Prague they proceeded to Berlin, GDR. In connection with this phase of his travels, Needleman commented, "By God, the Germans are the best, they treated us the best." Their Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SUPG) contact while in Berlin was Heinz Birch of the International Department, Central Committee, and he took care of all their needs while in the country.

In conversations with Birch, this individual provided a new mailing address for the CP, USA, which was as follows:

Heinz Birch
102 Berlin
Kleine Alexander Str. 28

He also provided the following telephone number for contact with him at Central Committee headquarters:

2023-3179

In furnishing the above address, Birch stated he was doing so because he felt there was something wrong and that possibly the people in the Party who utilize this address had the wrong one for him.

Birch also made mention of a "Brown Book" which had been published by the GDR and deals with Nazi war criminals currently active in the West German Government and/or living throughout the world. Previously, this "Brown Book" had been printed in German but now it was to be published in English as well. In connection with this "Brown Book," Birch stated he had received an order for it from a Phil Frankfeld, New Era Books, New York City. Birch asked who Frankfeld was and when he was informed that he was "one of us," Birch indicated that they would make a deal with him. He stated they could give him an exclusive for the "Brown Book" in the United States at bottom prices.

While in the GDR, Needleman had been in contact with Helga Lohr, a former American, who requested that an air mail subscription to "The Worker" be sent to her in the GDR. In regard to Lohr, Needleman stated he had learned that there was a general dissatisfaction in the GDR in regard to the work she is carrying out there.

Before leaving the GDR, Birch made inquiries concerning Morris Childs and asked if it was known when this individual might be expected in. No reason was given at the time by Birch for his desire to see him. Needleman also noted that a similar inquiry had been made by the Czechs in the International Department of the CPCZ before he had left that country.

When they returned to the United States, Needleman and [redacted] left from Berlin on a SAS Airline plane to Copenhagen, Denmark, where they changed and flew directly to New York City. b6 b7C

In analyzing the results of the trip, as reported by Needleman to a number of individuals, including Gus Hall, it appears that he brought back very little or no pertinent information but that the trip had been a success since they did negotiate for the purebred Arabian Polish stallion which had been the main purpose of the trip.

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Legat, Ottawa

2/17/66

Director, FBI
(100-428091)

1 - Shaw

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
EDUCATION
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Solo

There are enclosed three copies of a letterhead memorandum classified "~~Top Secret~~" and captioned as above which relate to the Marxist training school currently being held in Toronto, Canada, under the joint sponsorship of the Communist Party, USA - Communist Party of Canada.

Promptly furnish a copy of the enclosed memorandum to your source [redacted] Your source should be cautioned that it is essential that no distribution or use of our intelligence data is undertaken which would be likely to jeopardize the security of our source.

Enclosures (3)

1 - Foreign Liaison Unit (Route through for review)

WGS:pah
(5)



REC- 50

100-428091-5354
6 FEB 17 1966

NOTE:

A Marxist training school known as the Institute of Social Science sponsored jointly by the CPUSA and CP of Canada is currently being held in Toronto, Canada. The school is being financed by Soviet funds and is to take the place of schooling normally given in the Soviet Union. Ten students from each Party are in attendance at the school, and CPUSA National Educational Secretary Hyman Lumer, is one of the instructors.

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Wick _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____



FEB 23 1966

MAIL ROOM ☐

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

copy WGS
FISB

~~TOP SECRET~~

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

February 17, 1966

1 - Shaw

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
EDUCATION

The following information was supplied by a source which has furnished reliable information in the past.

Consideration is currently being given by the leaders of both the Communist Party, USA, and the Canadian Communist Party relative to continuing in 1967 the Marxist training school under the joint sponsorship of both parties. William Kashtan, General Secretary, Communist Party of Canada, has urged that a decision be reached in this matter prior to the end of March, 1966. Kashtan indicated that he would be leaving Canada in early March, 1966, in order to attend the 23rd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union scheduled to be held in Moscow, Russia. Kashtan, while in the Soviet Union, plans to discuss with Soviet officials the question of receiving an additional subsidy in 1967 which will enable the Communist Party, USA, and the Canadian Communist Party to continue their jointly sponsored Marxist training school.

100-428091

1 - Foreign Liaison Unit (Route through for review)

ORIGINAL & 2 COPIES TO LEGAT, OTTAWA, BY LETTER DATED 2/17/66.

WGS:pah
(6) *pah*

pen
NOTE: Classified "~~Top Secret~~" because unauthorized disclosure of this information could reveal the identity of the source (CG 5824-S*) who is of continuing value and such revelation could result in exceptionally grave damage to the Nation. Information extracted from CGairtel 2/11/66 captioned "Solo IS - C." LHM being sent Legat, Ottawa, for transmittal to Additional data concerning the joint CPUSA - Canadian CP school has been previously furnished to Legat for referral to

~~TOP SECRET~~

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Wick _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

100-428091-5354

b7D

RECEIVED
FEB 15 5 37 PM '66
TELETYPE
UNIT

TELETYPE UNIT
FEB 9 1962
ENCODED MESSAGE

6 FEB 7 59 AM '59

REC'D
SULLIVAN
POST OFFICE

REC'D DE LOACH
FEB 8 3 47 PM '66

RECEIVED-DIRECTOR
F. B. I.
FEB 8 11 57 AM '66

Domestic Intelligence Division

INFORMATIVE NOTE

Date 2/8/66

SOLO is code name for liaison activities of our informants (NY 694-S* and CG 5824-S*) between CPUSA and Communist Party of Soviet Union.

Attached relates to efforts of CPUSA to arrange for Robert Scheer, Editor of "Ramparts" magazine, to visit North Vietnam. Scheer is subject of current security investigation.

Dissemination will be made under ~~Top Secret~~ classification to the White House, Attorney General, State and CIA.

WGS:CSH

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END PAGE ONE
IMPERIALIST,
FOREIGN POLIT
VIETNAMESE CO
MOST U.S. ARMY

PAGE TWO

NATIONAL ELECTIONS, WHO HAS MANY BROAD CONNECTIONS IN IMPORTANT NATIONAL INNERPOLITICAL CIRCLES IN THE UNITED STATES, WILL BE IN CAMBODIA NEXT FEW DAYS AND WILL APPLY AT NORTH VIETNAMESE EMBASSY IN CAMBODIA FOR PERMISSION TO ENTER NORTH VIETNAM. URGENTLY REQUEST THAT HE BE INVITED TO NORTH VIETNAM AND BE GRANTED INTERVIEWS AND TALKS IN YOUR AUTHORITATIVE GOVERNMENT CIRCLES. REASON FOR HIS TRAVELING NOW IN SOUTHEAST ASIA IS TO GATHER FACTS AND MATERIAL FOR CAUSE OF PEACE AND IN FIGHT AGAINST UNITED STATES IMPERIALISM IN HIS PROGRAM IN HIS CAMPAIGN FOR CONGRESS. IF YOU CANNOT AND DO NOT GRANT HIM ENTRY INTO NORTH VIETNAM, THEN SUGGEST AN INTERVIEW AT THE EMBASSY. HE INTENDS TO SPREAD YOUR CAUSE FOR PEACE AND AGAINST UNITED STATES IMPERIALISM ON A NATION-WIDE SCALE AND IN CONGRESS WHEN ELECTED. GUS HALL"

SCHEER IS SUBJECT OF BUREAU FILE ONE ZERO FIVE DASH ONE ZERO SIX SEVEN TWO ZERO. SAN FRANCISCO BEING ADVISED BY SEPARATE COMMUNICATION.

END

JG

FBI WASH DC

CC-MR. SULLIVAN

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

FBI

Date: 2/11/66

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via AIRTEL REGISTERED MAIL
(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

FROM: SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SOLO
IS-C

On 2/10/66 CG 5824-S*, through a drop he maintains in Chicago, received a brief note from WILLIAM KASHTAN, General Secretary of the CP of Canada. This note which the source turned over to SAs WALTER A. BOYLE and RICHARD W. HANSEN on 2/10/66, together with certain parenthetical comments which had been added for the purpose of clarity, read as follows:

2/7/66

Dear Michael (CG 5824-S*),

We (Hy Lumer and CP of Canada representatives) had a few tentative discussions on the possibility of renewing the joint project (joint CP, USA - CP of Canada Marxist training school) next year and while we should await its conclusion to draw whatever lessons we can from it, there may be some value in reaching agreements at an early date on its continuation or otherwise, preferably before the end of March. (Apparently indicating CP of Canada representatives would be traveling to the USSR for the 23rd Congress and at that time could take up question of additional subsidy for joint project in 1967.)

100-1-904
③-Bureau (RM)1-New York (100-134637) (Info) (RM) REC-15
1-Chicago EX-112RWH:MDW
(5)100-428091-5356
6 FEB 18 1966Approved: *[Signature]*

Special Agent in Charge

Sent: _____

M

Per: _____

CG 134-46 Sub B

Let me know how you folks feel about it. Thanks again for the good wishes (on birth of his granddaughter). It was thoughtful of Herb (Gus Hall) and you.

All of the best as ever,

B. (William Kashtan)

P.S.: Two items. Could you arrange to send us a copy of Herbert's report (report of Hall to National Committee, CP, USA meeting, 1/66)? I still haven't seen it. We would also appreciate a copy of the program (CP, USA program scheduled for release 2/66).

In response to the above note received from KASHTAN, the source on 2/10/66 prepared the following self-explanatory note to KASHTAN which was mailed to a drop address in Toronto, Ontario, Canada:

2/10/66

Dear Bill,

We received yours of the 7th. Herbert is already aware of your suggestion about the joint project. We hope you had a fuller discussion with Hy on this project. We will try to send you Herb's report as soon as possible as well as a copy of the program. We ran into a technical problem on the program so it was delayed a little, but by the time you get this note that should be solved.

With all my best,

Michael

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : Mr. Conrad *JS*

FROM : C. F. Downing

SUBJECT: SOLO
INTERNAL SECURITY - ~~C~~

DATE: February 16, 1966

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Wick _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

for

Captioned case involves the Bureau's highly valuable confidential informant NY 694-S* who has been receiving communications transmitted to him by radio.

On 2/16/66, transmissions were heard by the Bureau's radio station at Midland at which time two messages, NR 864 GR 103 and NR 865 GR 29, were intercepted.

The plain text and cipher text are attached.

The New York Office is aware of the contents.

ACTION:

For information.

A
ENCLOSURE

Enclosure

- 1 - Mr. Conrad
- 2 - Mr. Sullivan (Attention: Mr. J. A. Sizoo, Mr. W. G. Shaw)
- 1 - Mr. Downing
- 1 - Mr. Newpher
- 1 - Mr. Paddock

HS
HS:dek
(7)

REC-22

EX-100

100-428091-5357
6 FEB 21 1966

File
65 FEB 25 1966

2/16/66

NR 0864 GR 103

02/16/66

TQ BIRCH, WHEN BARLEY DISCUSSED IN NEST QUESTION OF INVITATION BY OUR FRIENDSHIP SOCIETY OF HIGH SOCIAL AND CULTURAL WORKERS GROUP HE WAS ASKED TO ASCERTAIN YOUR PLANS IN RESPECT TO GALAMISON'S GROUP SINCE ITS VISIT WAS PLANNED BEFORE. IF GALAMISON'S GROUP CANNOT COME TO NEST OUR FRIENDSHIP SOCIETY IS READY TO INVITE. IF YOU AGREE, ANOTHER GROUP ORGANIZED BY BARLEY, ADVISE YOUR OPINION. R5555

NR 0864 GR 103

02/16/66

76002 37853 48025 07769 21110 65566 82688 60274 11638 05831
89299 05138 65222 88271 01358 14070 73004 09255 42765 97008
99563 24757 69062 84644 48172 77308 34313 70807 70352 70039
89277 17630 73701 10796 44584 61262 63264 34835 02743 83816
40453 41403 11370 36779 41046 42096 89089 07217 21117 90537
60409 38583 55057 82387 59004 89420 47108 29833 15008 40617
25624 47520 03104 73619 89722 20373 57410 84998 51957 04391
79562 84278 59543 97009 49982 27457 02581 14566 56710 51604
15512 63099 25148 85529 49220 43649 44871 65070 66401 50298
69149 43410 95692 08692 56819 50931 58645 78562 82954 43386
12371 08209 27819

ENC.

100-428091-5359

2/16/66

NR 0865 GR 029

02/16/66

NEXT|UNCLE|IS|ARMSTRONG|THE|ELL|IOT|ELL|IOT|AND|CARL|CARL|

|PLEASE|BE|READY|FOR|COLOUR|PRINTS|IN|FEBRUARY|SSSSS

NR 0865 GR 029

02/16/66

38589 98040 61429 06179 90858 78522 76245 71334 54949 80826

27242 12273 75192 70520 70879 34672 99021 94912 92921 72439

09730 06219 51675 16769 47541 55011 51270 54014 99110

100-428091-5357

REC-22
ROUTE IN ENVELOPE
 FBI

Date: 2/10/66

Transmit the following in _____
 (Type in plaintext or code)Via AIRTEL REGISTERED MAIL
 (Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

FROM: SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SOLO
 IS-C

On 2/10/66 CG 5824-S* advised that on the previous evening he had spoken on the telephone to NY 694-S* who had informed him that GUS HALL had instructed that the CP of the Soviet Union be requested to assist ROBERT SCHEER, Editor of "Ramparts" Magazine, to get to North Vietnam. SCHEER has announced his candidacy for the U.S. Congress and has indicated he desires to travel to North Vietnam under the guise of collecting information for that position.

As you will recall, on 12/15/65 CG 5824-S* advised that HALL had instructed him to communicate to the CP of the Soviet Union that SCHEER desired to go to North Vietnam as a correspondent and that the CP of the Soviet Union should help him to do so. HALL subsequently told CG 5824-S* to forget about it, that SCHEER would not be going. Subsequent to his conversation with NY 694-S*, CG 5824-S* recalled that in early 12/65 AL RICHMOND had prepared a note to HALL relative to this matter. CG 5824-S* was able to locate a copy of this note, the contents of which were as follows:

"Robert Scheer, foreign editor of Ramparts Magazine, wants to go to North Vietnam as a journalist.

"Scheer has written some of the best and most effective material on the Vietnamese war in this country, and has established a reputation as an expert on this subject.

1-804
 2-Bureau (RM)

1-New York (100-134637) (Info) (RM)

2-Chicago

(1 - A) 134-46 Sub B-91)

WAB:MDW

(6)

REC-22

EX-100

100-428091-535

6 FEB 21 1966

Approved: *[Signature]*

Sent _____

M

Per _____

65 FEB 25 1966 Special Agent in Charge

CG 134-46 Sub B

"In outlook he is a 'New Left' type. He disagrees with the Communist position and is critical of the socialist world. However, he very vigorously espouses the following position today:

"Whatever the socialist world may have done wrong in the past the fact is that today the danger to world peace is created by the efforts of the U.S. to crush colonial revolutions - in Vietnam, Cuba, etc. The issue is, therefore, to check and halt U.S. aggression against colonial revolution. On Vietnam his position is that the military intervention by the U.S. is aggressive, reactionary and immoral; that the U.S. should withdraw.

"Al Richmond -

"(My own opinion is that we should help him get to Vietnam.)"

This information will be furnished to San Francisco under the caption of "ROBERT SCHEER." San Francisco has already been instructed to handle in accordance with instructions relative to foreign travel of security subjects.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOIPA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET

No Duplication Fees are charged for Deleted Page Information Sheet(s).

Total Deleted Page(s) ~ 8

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Page 11 ~ b7D

Page 12 ~ b7D

Page 13 ~ b7D

Page 17 ~ Referral/Direct

Page 28 ~ Referral/Direct

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Page 30 ~ Referral/Direct